In this model we use delay as a tool to reduce demand in a public health care system when the public resources are not sufficient to match demand. Our results show that: 1) the presence of a waiting time implies that politicians might well exploit voters� unease in order to set rent seeking practices, because the voting agenda might be not straightforward; 2) the waiting time may be used to improve incomes redistribution when the Government has a strong preference towards the provision of health care, and against money transfer outlays.
Delay and Public Expenditure Determination for Health Care
LEVAGGI, Rosella
2007-01-01
Abstract
In this model we use delay as a tool to reduce demand in a public health care system when the public resources are not sufficient to match demand. Our results show that: 1) the presence of a waiting time implies that politicians might well exploit voters� unease in order to set rent seeking practices, because the voting agenda might be not straightforward; 2) the waiting time may be used to improve incomes redistribution when the Government has a strong preference towards the provision of health care, and against money transfer outlays.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
