Crisis risk management in Municipal Owned Companies between accountability and institutional isomorphism

This study examines risk management (RM) reporting as an accountability mechanism in Italian Municipal-Owned Companies (MOCs), investigating how institutional pressures – mimetic, normative, and coercive isomorphism – shape RM disclosure practices within the Corporate Governance Report (Relazione sul Governo Societario, RGS). Drawing on new institutional theory, the study combines a structured content analysis of RGS documents from 57 MOCs controlled by twelve major Italian municipalities (2018–2021) examining temporal and cross-group variability of RM disclosure. Findings reveal a differentiated pattern of institutional isomorphism. Normative isomorphism emerges as a stable, already-diffused compliance orientation rather than an intensifying trend, privileging low-complexity, financial-ratio-based disclosure over forward-looking risk indicators. Mimetic isomorphism is statistically supported, but is conditioned by public-group membership rather than generalized across the sample. Coercive isomorphism operates decisively on the existence of the RGS – mandated by law for all sampled MOCs – but not on its content, indicating that regulatory pressure secures disclosure in form without ensuring convergence in substance. The study contributes to the limited literature on RM in the public sector by offering an empirically grounded of how the three isomorphic mechanisms operate differently on the form and substance of accountability disclosure in corporatized public service provision. These findings carry practical implications for policymakers and public managers, pointing to the need for regulatory and professional guidance that moves beyond compliance with formal disclosure obligations toward fostering a more substantively integrated, forward-looking risk management culture within MOCs.