The Delimitation of Multi-Member Districts: Political and Territorial Mis-Representativeness

The Italian electoral system, following the declaration of unconstitutionality of long closed lists by the Constitutional Court, introduced medium-small multi-member districts and restricted the number of candidates per list. However, these changes have led to distortions in both territorial and political representativeness. The alteration of "territorial representativeness”, primarily due to “seat shifting”, affects the allocation of seats among multi-member districts based on population. This phenomenon, combined with rules for rescuing candidates, can lead to significant discrepancies between allocated and expected seats. Moreover, the electoral system induces distortions in “political representativeness”, as the allocation of seats may not align with voter preferences. These distortions violate several rules. Additionally, the apparent brevity of closed lists is illusory, as voters’ choices may indirectly elect candidates from other districts. Thus, despite efforts to design multi-member districts that reflect local communities, the current electoral system fails to ensure territorial and political representativeness. Given the potential for distortion, efforts should focus on minimizing these effects within the multiple constraints of district design prescribed by current legislation, within the narrow margins where this is possible