Channel State Information (CSI)-based localization with 802.11 has been proven feasible in multiple scenarios and is becoming a serious threat to people's privacy in workplaces, at home, and maybe even outdoors. Countering unauthorized localization without hampering communications is a non-trivial task, although some very recent works suggest that it is feasible with marginal modification of the 802.11 transmission chain, but this requires modifying 802.11 devices. Furthermore, if the attacker controls two devices and not just a receiver, transmission side signal manipulation cannot help. This work explores the possibility of countering CSI based localization with an active device that, instead of jamming signals to avoid that a malicious receiver exploits CSI information to locate a person, superimpose on frames a copy of the same frame signal whose goal is not destroying reception as in jamming, but only obfuscate the location-relevant information carried by the CSI. A prototype implementation and early results look promising; they show the feasibility of location obfuscation with high efficiency and excellent preservation of communication performance, and indicate that the technique works both against passive attacks, where the attacker controls only a receiver, and active ones, where he/she controls both a transmitter and a receiver. These results pave the road for further research on smart spaces that preserve users’ privacy with a technical solution and not only via legal prescriptions.
AntiSense: Standard-compliant CSI obfuscation against unauthorized Wi-Fi sensing
Cominelli M.Membro del Collaboration Group
;Gringoli F.Membro del Collaboration Group
;Lo Cigno R.
Membro del Collaboration Group
2022-01-01
Abstract
Channel State Information (CSI)-based localization with 802.11 has been proven feasible in multiple scenarios and is becoming a serious threat to people's privacy in workplaces, at home, and maybe even outdoors. Countering unauthorized localization without hampering communications is a non-trivial task, although some very recent works suggest that it is feasible with marginal modification of the 802.11 transmission chain, but this requires modifying 802.11 devices. Furthermore, if the attacker controls two devices and not just a receiver, transmission side signal manipulation cannot help. This work explores the possibility of countering CSI based localization with an active device that, instead of jamming signals to avoid that a malicious receiver exploits CSI information to locate a person, superimpose on frames a copy of the same frame signal whose goal is not destroying reception as in jamming, but only obfuscate the location-relevant information carried by the CSI. A prototype implementation and early results look promising; they show the feasibility of location obfuscation with high efficiency and excellent preservation of communication performance, and indicate that the technique works both against passive attacks, where the attacker controls only a receiver, and active ones, where he/she controls both a transmitter and a receiver. These results pave the road for further research on smart spaces that preserve users’ privacy with a technical solution and not only via legal prescriptions.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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