We present a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between a malicious node, attempting to perform unauthorized radio transmission, and friendly jammers trying to disrupt the malicious communications. We investigate the strategic behavior of the jammers against a rational malicious node and highlight counterintuitive results for this conflict. We also analyze the impact of multiple friendly jammers sharing the same goal but acting without coordination; we find out that this scenario offers a better payoff for the jammers, which has some strong implications on how to implement friendly jamming.
A Game of One/Two Strategic Friendly Jammers Versus a Malicious Strategic Node
francesco gringoli
2019-01-01
Abstract
We present a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between a malicious node, attempting to perform unauthorized radio transmission, and friendly jammers trying to disrupt the malicious communications. We investigate the strategic behavior of the jammers against a rational malicious node and highlight counterintuitive results for this conflict. We also analyze the impact of multiple friendly jammers sharing the same goal but acting without coordination; we find out that this scenario offers a better payoff for the jammers, which has some strong implications on how to implement friendly jamming.File in questo prodotto:
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