Democrazia rappresentativa e solidarietà nella governance economica europea: una lettura alla luce delle previsioni del Two Pack

This paper starts from far (the European governance and, in particular, the European Economic governance) and arrives nearer (representative democracy and National Parliaments). While a constitutionalist scholar is not used to work with the first concept, the second one is the core of the modern constitutionalism. The paper does not deny the validity of the interdisciplinary concept of governance and acknowledges that as soon as National Parliaments come across the governance processes their traditional role is changing. Following this methodological approach, the paper notices that if the European (and global) governance has already flawed National Parliaments’ traditional role the European economic governance has caused a further restraint on their political scope through benchmarks and statistical indicators. It is also far from this paper’s aims to challenge the validity of the economic theories underlying the European economic governance procedures. But it is within a constitutionalist scholar’s duties to defend the pivotal role of National Parliaments in economic, fiscal and budget policies, not only because these subjects remain within the Member States’ competences (although under the European coordination, surveillance and corrective mechanisms) but also because of their political implications in term of social justice better represented by the inclusiveness and pluralism of National Parliaments. Paradoxically, although European law has contributed to the declining role of National Parliaments, it has triggered their enhancement in the European institutional procedures, lastly through the Two Pack’s provisions. Among these provisions we have selected the ones which have opened a direct contact between the European Commission and National Parliaments because of their «multiple virtues» towards further European integration, EU’s democratic legitimacy and solidarity among Member States. The first virtue is about the institutional dynamics which – at national level – enhance National Parliaments’ control powers towards National Governments while – at European level – (re)balance the Commission within the European institutional framework. The second virtue is about the awareness processes which – at national level – strengthen European knowledge and solidarity in National Parliaments (Art. 12, par. 1 and Art. 3, par. 3, TEU), and – at European level – put in contact the European Commission with the pluralistic and inclusive politics represented in National Parliaments fostering the politicisation started by the Article 17, par. 7, TEU which links the appointment of the Commission’s President to the elections of the European Parliament . So European law has thrown the seeds of National Parliaments’ awareness participation, if they wanted, to the European economic governance, in a euro-national institutional maturity perspective. The promise of these European law’s provisions is towards a more democratic legitimacy in the European economic governance favouring more economic and budgetary integration and solidarity among Member States. But the implied perspective of this promise seems to hide an impotence and guilt acknowledgment by National Governments which for succeeding in their purpose (against the spread Euroscepticism) they have had to call in accountability National Parliaments. A timid recovery of representative democracy over European economic governance procedures? Surely a clear evidence of the current validity of the concept inside changing contexts (those of the European economic governance) which also appears as a necessary instrument for developing more integration and solidarity among Member States within the European economic processes.