We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
PERSUASION IN EXPERIMENTAL ULTIMATUM GAMES
GALIZZI, Matteo Maria;
2010-01-01
Abstract
We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.File in questo prodotto:
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