For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson’s definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.
Two remarks on the Inner Core
MINELLI, Enrico
2005-01-01
Abstract
For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson’s definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.File in questo prodotto:
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