We consider the Nash equilibrium problem with vector payoffs in a topological vector space. By employing the recent concept of relative ( pseudo) monotonicity, we establish several existence results for vector Nash equilibria and vector equilibria. The results strengthen in a major way existence results for vector equilibrium problems which were based on the usual ( generalized) monotonicity concepts.
Non-cooperative games with vector payoffs under relative pseudomonotonicity
ALLEVI, Elisabetta;
2003-01-01
Abstract
We consider the Nash equilibrium problem with vector payoffs in a topological vector space. By employing the recent concept of relative ( pseudo) monotonicity, we establish several existence results for vector Nash equilibria and vector equilibria. The results strengthen in a major way existence results for vector equilibrium problems which were based on the usual ( generalized) monotonicity concepts.File in questo prodotto:
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