The paper first reconstructs the evolution over time of the Italian regional form of government, transitioning from an initial parliamentary model (with a prevalence of the assemblies) to a pseudo-parliamentary model. This current model is based on the direct election of the President, the election of a majority in the regional Council linked to the President’s election, and the automatic dissolution of the Council in case of a no-confidence vote and subsequent resignation of the elected President. The paper then evaluates the institutional outcomes of these forms of government, highlighting that while the current standard form has ensured the stability of executive bodies, it has done so at the expenses of the Councils’ legislative and oversight role, the institutional balance of powers, the effective representativeness of the institutions and the democratic participation of citizens and local institutions in shaping the regional policies. The paper further proposes a reform of the Regions’ form of government, whereby the choice between two governance models would be left to regional statutory autonomy: a classic presidential model, based on the separation and balance of powers between the President and the Council, and a parliamentary form of government, rationalized to reconcile the representativeness of regional institutions, the stability of executive bodies, the restoration of a role for the Councils, and the enhancement of the participation of citizens and local entities. Achieving these institutional policy objectives would also require several significant complementary reforms, which the paper examines in its final section.
L'evoluzione della forma di governo regionale e la sua possibile riforma
lorenzo spadacini
;daniele casanova
2025-01-01
Abstract
The paper first reconstructs the evolution over time of the Italian regional form of government, transitioning from an initial parliamentary model (with a prevalence of the assemblies) to a pseudo-parliamentary model. This current model is based on the direct election of the President, the election of a majority in the regional Council linked to the President’s election, and the automatic dissolution of the Council in case of a no-confidence vote and subsequent resignation of the elected President. The paper then evaluates the institutional outcomes of these forms of government, highlighting that while the current standard form has ensured the stability of executive bodies, it has done so at the expenses of the Councils’ legislative and oversight role, the institutional balance of powers, the effective representativeness of the institutions and the democratic participation of citizens and local institutions in shaping the regional policies. The paper further proposes a reform of the Regions’ form of government, whereby the choice between two governance models would be left to regional statutory autonomy: a classic presidential model, based on the separation and balance of powers between the President and the Council, and a parliamentary form of government, rationalized to reconcile the representativeness of regional institutions, the stability of executive bodies, the restoration of a role for the Councils, and the enhancement of the participation of citizens and local entities. Achieving these institutional policy objectives would also require several significant complementary reforms, which the paper examines in its final section.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.