Aim of the Study: The paper tries to examine how the evolution of the principles of corporate governance can promote improvement in other fields as well. Specifically, it aims to investigate whether the imposition of quotas on the boards of big corporations encourage gender balance outside the companies themselves Design/Methodology: Through qualitative analysis and descriptive statistics, the paper investigates the secondary effect of the introduction of quota law in Italy. The analysis verified two hypotheses. First is about the under- representation of women within the board of companies not covered by quota law. Second about the percentage of women in key decision-making positions, after the approval of quota law. Findings: The study shows that the imposition of a quota law has an excellent effect on the societies to which the law is addressed directly, but insufficient results in terms of cultural change. Practical Implications: For scholars, this research intends to verify the effectiveness of a coercive systems for the achievement of gender equality. Board members and practitioners could exploit the findings of this research to trace the future path of their companies in the gender area. Policy makers and authorities have a valid tool at their disposal to develop an effective gender policy, basing the choices on objective results, net of political conditioning and bias. Originality/value: Scholars have highlighted the positive effects of quota law in economic terms, while others have outlined the potential in social terms. This last aspect, only generically studied, represents a gap in the literature. For this reason, the paper deepens and investigates the secondary effects of this regulatory approach, about relevant roles of key decision-making positions in the economic, political, and social fields.
Gender Balance Above Corporate Governance Quotas
Tommaso Fornasari
2022-01-01
Abstract
Aim of the Study: The paper tries to examine how the evolution of the principles of corporate governance can promote improvement in other fields as well. Specifically, it aims to investigate whether the imposition of quotas on the boards of big corporations encourage gender balance outside the companies themselves Design/Methodology: Through qualitative analysis and descriptive statistics, the paper investigates the secondary effect of the introduction of quota law in Italy. The analysis verified two hypotheses. First is about the under- representation of women within the board of companies not covered by quota law. Second about the percentage of women in key decision-making positions, after the approval of quota law. Findings: The study shows that the imposition of a quota law has an excellent effect on the societies to which the law is addressed directly, but insufficient results in terms of cultural change. Practical Implications: For scholars, this research intends to verify the effectiveness of a coercive systems for the achievement of gender equality. Board members and practitioners could exploit the findings of this research to trace the future path of their companies in the gender area. Policy makers and authorities have a valid tool at their disposal to develop an effective gender policy, basing the choices on objective results, net of political conditioning and bias. Originality/value: Scholars have highlighted the positive effects of quota law in economic terms, while others have outlined the potential in social terms. This last aspect, only generically studied, represents a gap in the literature. For this reason, the paper deepens and investigates the secondary effects of this regulatory approach, about relevant roles of key decision-making positions in the economic, political, and social fields.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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