We, humans, live under the impression that agents’ conscious intentions to act are at the origin of our actions. However, experimental evidence challenged this common intuition of free will, suggesting that such subjective experience is something of a perceptual illusion. The awareness of the intention to act would be generated as a side effect of unconscious processes that determine our decisions. If proven true, such a conclusion would shake the cornerstones of western ethics and law as it would require a profound revision of the concept of moral responsibility. A possible way outcomes from our ability to inhibit “pending” actions, i.e., to exert a veto power. In fact, although awareness of intention appears after the start of an action-related brain process, it still precedes the physical execution of a movement, allowing a person enough time to withhold the upcoming action if the expected outcome might be inappropriate. Thus, we would be in control of our actions by exerting free will not. Although it is appropriate to be very cautious when interpreting the results of the empirical approach of neuroscience to such complex mental phenomena, as it bears some intrinsic limitations, empirical evidence gathered so far suggests that, except specific medical conditions, we are free of choosing what and how to do, and thus, we are responsible for our actions.

Does the Power to Suppress an Action Make Us ‘Free’?

Mirabella G.
2021-01-01

Abstract

We, humans, live under the impression that agents’ conscious intentions to act are at the origin of our actions. However, experimental evidence challenged this common intuition of free will, suggesting that such subjective experience is something of a perceptual illusion. The awareness of the intention to act would be generated as a side effect of unconscious processes that determine our decisions. If proven true, such a conclusion would shake the cornerstones of western ethics and law as it would require a profound revision of the concept of moral responsibility. A possible way outcomes from our ability to inhibit “pending” actions, i.e., to exert a veto power. In fact, although awareness of intention appears after the start of an action-related brain process, it still precedes the physical execution of a movement, allowing a person enough time to withhold the upcoming action if the expected outcome might be inappropriate. Thus, we would be in control of our actions by exerting free will not. Although it is appropriate to be very cautious when interpreting the results of the empirical approach of neuroscience to such complex mental phenomena, as it bears some intrinsic limitations, empirical evidence gathered so far suggests that, except specific medical conditions, we are free of choosing what and how to do, and thus, we are responsible for our actions.
2021
978-3-030-54563-5
978-3-030-54564-2
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11379/554696
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