The recent proposal of the Constitutional reform, defeated by the referendum vote of the 4th December 2016, was based on the assumption of a structural (rather than political) weakness of the Italian parliamentary system, due to the lack of effective power in favour of the Government over the parliamentary agenda. In particular, the reform aimed at speeding up the decision-making process by affecting, at the same time, the bicameralism and the management of the timing of the legislative process. Indeed, despite a variety of reforms over the years, both central-right and central-left parties, but many scholars too, still complain the absence of legal rules and structures provided in other mature democracies, thus emphasising in particular the distance with the UK Westminster model, where the Cabinet acts as the “leading Committee of Parliament” to enhance its policies. Nevertheless, it seems that these proposals are based on a misunderstanding of the nature and effects of procedures and practices of UK Parliament, focusing only on the very strong formal powers available to the Whitehall Cabinet in the law-making process, ignoring the practical ability of the two Houses to delay government legislation, thereby representing considerable institutional and political limitations. This article considers the various rules and practices that determine the organization of parliamentary time in Westminster, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the elements that, taken together, give rise to a substantial form of constitutional constraint.
The Grass Is Always Greener. Mutual Misperception of Government Control over the Length of the Legislative Process in Italy and the UK.
Arianna Carminati
2018-01-01
Abstract
The recent proposal of the Constitutional reform, defeated by the referendum vote of the 4th December 2016, was based on the assumption of a structural (rather than political) weakness of the Italian parliamentary system, due to the lack of effective power in favour of the Government over the parliamentary agenda. In particular, the reform aimed at speeding up the decision-making process by affecting, at the same time, the bicameralism and the management of the timing of the legislative process. Indeed, despite a variety of reforms over the years, both central-right and central-left parties, but many scholars too, still complain the absence of legal rules and structures provided in other mature democracies, thus emphasising in particular the distance with the UK Westminster model, where the Cabinet acts as the “leading Committee of Parliament” to enhance its policies. Nevertheless, it seems that these proposals are based on a misunderstanding of the nature and effects of procedures and practices of UK Parliament, focusing only on the very strong formal powers available to the Whitehall Cabinet in the law-making process, ignoring the practical ability of the two Houses to delay government legislation, thereby representing considerable institutional and political limitations. This article considers the various rules and practices that determine the organization of parliamentary time in Westminster, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the elements that, taken together, give rise to a substantial form of constitutional constraint.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
