We present and explore a link between social optimality and risk-neutral dynamics satisfied in the equilibrium of emission markets. Our contribution addresses market modeling in the setting of risk-averse market players and goes beyond all existing models in this field, which neglect risk-aversion aspects at the cost of having a wide range of singularities.

Risk-Averse Equilibrium Modeling and Social Optimality of Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms

FALBO, PAOLO;HINZ, JURI;PELIZZARI, CRISTIAN
2015-01-01

Abstract

We present and explore a link between social optimality and risk-neutral dynamics satisfied in the equilibrium of emission markets. Our contribution addresses market modeling in the setting of risk-averse market players and goes beyond all existing models in this field, which neglect risk-aversion aspects at the cost of having a wide range of singularities.
978-3-319-13880-0
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11379/458770
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