

Censorship between conceptual evolutions and social changes

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Abstract

This paper traces the concept of censorship in the light of the most recent conceptualizations both in the psychoanalytic and in the neurosciences. In particular, we focus on the thought of Bion, Matte Blaco, Civitarese, Bucci, Panksepp and Solms. The scientific contributions are then used for a comparison and for a reading of the forms of censorship in the current society. In particular, the importance of the emotional dimension is emphasized, rather than the cognitive one, as a tool to face the censorship.

Key words: Censorship, Repression, Affect, Relationships, Cognition.

Introduction

The term “censure” etymologically refers to the Latin verb “censeo” that means “to express an opinion, to judge, to value, to include” (Castiglioni, Mariotti 1966), but in our culture the predominant meaning is “to control, to condemn and to repress contents, ideas or expressions by an authoritative claim” (Treccani). Especially in the field of law, it refers to a “limitation of civil freedom of thought, commanded for the safeguard of the public interest and realized by the authority through the examination of printed texts or journals, fliers or announcements to affix publically, theatrical opera or films to represent, Internet websites, in order to permit or forbid the publication, the posting, the representation etc.” (Treccani).

Therefore, the censorship is considered as opposed to freedom and namely to a person’s liberty of express his own beliefs and ideas. The liberty of express is one of the most ancient forms of freedom, already stated by the first Christian writers during II-III centuries, and defended as a constitutional right. It is interesting to notice how, even though some documents refers to *freedom of speech* (I amendment, Constitution of the U.S.A. 1787) or *freedom of the press* (art. 18, Constitution of Belgium 1831; art. 28, Albertine Statute), in many other documents the chosen expression was *freedom of opinion* (art. 11, The Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789; art. 8, Constitution of France 1849; art. 118, Constitution of Germany 1919; art. 5 Fundamental Law of Germany 1949; art. 20, Constitution of Spain 1978; art. 16, Constitution of Switzerland 1999).

We could read some underlying implications in this: the first and more self-evident one is that the freedom of speech coincides with the freedom of thinking or judging something, with a more or less strong subjective emphasis (opinion); the second and subtler one is that what our mind elaborates is entirely developed

in a declarative form and therefore susceptible of being told. But could the freedom of thought is 'on prescription'?

By looking at the dates reported above, we can observe a parade of the constitutional documents in a large time period, from the end of the XVIII century to the end of the XX century, therefore these "mortgages" seem to have gone through different societies and cultures.

Next to this element of stability, discontinuity and changes can be highlighted both at a social and at a scientific levels. This work will try to sketch out some of the modalities of thinking and implementing censorship, reading these changes both in the society and in the psychoanalytical thought.

Censorship in Freud's time and thought

Valuing his own scientific work, Freud attributes to himself a special credit: to have revealed that our mind has not a unique way of functioning. Indeed, Freud discerned two ways of operating: the primary and the secondary processes. But the seeds of the concept of censorship appeared long before elaborating this thought, (letter to Fliess on 22 December 1897, Interpretation of dreams, 1899), since talking about censorship means thinking that different ways of functioning and different needs exist altogether in our mind.

Indeed, Freud talks about a censorship that acts inside a person and chooses this word as "... *a term that can appropriately design a dynamic relationship*" (Freud, 1915-17, pp. 313).

As censorship in social terms is considered as a protection, thus the internal censorship protects and defends from the perception of anguish and sufferings,

even if it doesn't defend from all the forms of distress: in fact even the censorship can be cause of limitations, pain and symptoms.

Bidirectional more than univocal relationships likely exist between the two types of censorship, the social and the individual one. Indeed, it is easy to assume that culture and society affect the censure that a person acts on his own mental contents, but it also happens that prohibitions and censures that find place at an institutional level can be aligned with individual defences in relation to the anguish of living (refer, in this regard, to the concept of institution of Jacques, 1966).

In other words, if we can think the man as "*an artificial abstraction [...] essentially and inevitably determined by the world he lives in, by the society, the group he takes part to*" (Foulkes, 1948, pp. 38), we can also recognise that the community and culture are shaped by the features of the individuals constituting them.

The fact that it is easier to consider personal constraints as they would come by the outside could be the demonstration of the capacity of dissimulation of the internal censorship.

According to Freud, censorship prevalently acts in dreams, in neurotic symptoms and delirium utterances. By almost using the term as a metaphor, Freud suggests some social images in which censorship is implemented. He identifies different levels of censure that grow out from neurosis to psychosis, even though the clinical focus remains mainly associated to a neurotic structure, in which the repression mechanism is fully expressed.

He therefore sees censorship acting in psychosis as a sort of tsarist censure, in which the written text is filled with black lines obfuscating the incriminated passages (Freud, 1899, pp. 483), but other, more pervasive and common manifestations exist, which he recognises in the everyday-life, for example in the

modulation of power relations and in the dissimulation of courtesy. Other kinds of censorship are “the masks”, namely those images, result of an “*unaware hypocrisy*” that actually constitute us; the suppression, that is to say the gaps, the scotomizations of parts of psychic products; the deformations and the disguises that we can find in dreams and in our vigil thoughts (Freud 1915-17, pp.314).

Especially in Freud’s first written works and, in an emblematic way, in the image of the deleted text, there’s something reassuring: the idea that there is a talk, a coherence, an existence, a sense, even if lost. We observe, a later, that the identification of the existence of a meaning is fundamental compared to the way of intend not only psychosis, but our whole mental functioning and it’s essential in determining the approach towards patients (and even relations with new-borns).

There’s a clue that the mind has been capable of elaborating reality, even though it has forgotten or modified the product of this elaboration. It’s a written and then delated page, not an already missing page. The viewpoint is indeed asking ourselves why and what has been removed, especially with the prospect that, like an archaeologist, the analyst is able to bring to light all the things that time buried (repression, Freud 1937). His instruments are transfer, dream, free associations, parapraxis, lapsus calami and lapsus linguae...

This is coherent with the first idea (first topography) of subconscious as something concrete, and not like an attribute, that can be also applied to Ego and Super-Ego.

This “solidity” can be regain in the classic epistemology and in the positive science. This contains an underlying idea of organized world, in which the aim of the scientist is to find the law that harmonically governs the world, a unitary reality, integrated, run by a univocal power, timeless and given once and for all,

governed by anonymous laws, impersonal and supreme; a perfectly directed world, balanced, not subjected to changes, self-existing, regardless of being perceived by humans or not (Morin, 2007).

Surely, the Freudian anthropology is destabilizing compared to the contemporaneous pre-dominant one. Freud was well aware of this, since in the *Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (1915-17) he wrote: “Over the past times, humanity had to bear two big mortifications that science brought to its ingenuous love for itself.

The first, when it knew that the Earth was not in the centre of the universe (...). The second mortification came later, when biological research annihilated the claimed privileged position that the man thought to have in the creation, it showed him his provenience from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable belonging to it. (...) But the third and more burning mortification that man’s megalomania had to endure came from the modern psychological exploration, which wants to demonstrate the Ego that he is not the master in his own house, but he has to rely on limited information about what unconsciously happens in the mind. Even this remind on looking inside ourselves was not firstly suggested by us psychoanalysts, but it seems our responsibility to support it in the most energetic way and to strengthen it with empiric material closely affecting all the men”.

“But already in his last works, Freud built up new sceneries, new systems of defence that we could hardly allocate to censure. (...) We then get in the phase when reference to censorship seems diminished, changed and then gone extinct. In the modern and less modern post-Freudian literature this seems to me an obvious fact, which we should not necessarily be pleased with, though. Censorship will end being an aspect that only concerns the processes interfering with the constitution of an unconscious sense.” (Petrella 1999, 2012)

Contemporary authors' considerations

Through the historical evolution, a central element that obscured or resized censorship (together with both primitive mechanisms, especially the projective identification (Ogden, 1991), dissociations (Putnam, 1989; Bromberg, 1998), and different ways of functioning and pathologies (alexithymia, affective regulation difficulty, trauma outcomes, forms of addictions with or without a substance craving) was the growing attention to the theorization of proto-mental and the constitution of the mind (Bion, 1961, Imbasciati, 1998) on one side and to the study of pre-verbal and fetal experiences on the other (Manfredi, Imbasciati, 2004).

Beyond the different authors and what has been highlighted, there's an enormous diversity between the image of a subject that has removed some contents, some ideas, some affections and the image of a subject that is born without a sense of continuity, of belonging and without boundaries (the elements that base the fundamental trust and characterize the primary functioning, on whose results, more or less adaptive, the secondary functioning will modulate) (Orefice, 2002); with a mind that is not unitary, but composed by different states of mind (Feldman, 1999; Whitmer, 2001; Anderson, Gold, 2003; Bromberg, 2008), different configurations of the relation between the self and the other or behavioural modalities and that, from these, only gradually finds a coherence and a continuity constituting a cohesive sense of personal identity – an overarching feeling of “self-being” (Bromberg, 2008); a mind that first needs to be considered by someone else in order to constitute itself and needs to find itself “in the mother's eyes (Gergely, 2000)”.

The possibility of attributing a meaning to the experiences turns to be connected to the development of a cohesive, flexible and unitary sense of self. “It is the maternal affective and connected mirroring of primary emotional states firstly

produced by the body functioning of the baby, that leads the baby himself to recognize his feelings. These secondary representations of affective states (Gergely *ib.*) constitute the core of the structure of the self’.

According to Slade (2010), the translation of the baby’s feelings into words needs to be implemented for a long time before he is able to comprehend and take on board those representations.

Namely, this activity could already begin during pregnancy, when the representation might be formed together with the sets of meanings that would progressively be negotiated, integrated and modified once they meet the real baby, which substitutes the ideal one. In this perspective, the awareness is linked to language: what is conscious can be declared and told.

Slade writes: *“It’s only when the baby is almost two that the exact words of the mother and the ones of the baby are meant to expand, strengthen or delete the experience of the self. Language literally determines what one knows about himself; the expressions and affections that haven’t been expressed with language remain not metabolized or split.”* (Slade, 2010).

The failures of mirroring, either because *“too much accurate or too much realistic”* or because *“disjointed”*, don’t permit the normal connection between primary and secondary representations of affection and self. In these situations, the baby can’t make experience of the parent’s mind as a known and safe place, in which he may learn representations and meanings.

“The affections that are not present in the mother’s mind or, more significantly, are bad-represented or distorted remain indeterminate, terrific and not representable, so that they lead in the following years to a wide range of phenomena and pathologies typical of a borderline self” (*ib.*, pp. 27).

We are in a landscape that is very different from the first one. The point is not “what is not told” anymore, but it’s “the emptiness”, the incapacity of elaborating and representing. In this case, the concepts of censorship and subconscious, at least like they have been described above, aren’t functional to the description anymore (and much less to the explanation). Thus, another kind of subconscious is emerging, suggesting that not all of what is unconscious is removed. And it was already guessed by Freud, but more precisely described by recent authors, even though with different highlights.

It must be emphasised how in this view a key element is the encounter with neurosciences, especially for what regards the structures of memory and subconscious.

It is given for granted that memory is not immutable, but emotional recollections are subjected to new ones’ influence, thanks to the reconsolidation’s action (Nader, Hardt, 2009) and the reconsolidation takes place any time something is recalled (Hardt, 2010). It should be noted how the reconsolidation is in line with the Freudian transcription *Nachträglichkeit*.

But most of all, the idea of a censorship linked to a removed subconscious, that works from the beginning of mental life is unsustainable, being the designated structure for this operation (explicit memory – hippocampus and medial-temporal cortex) immature until the baby is two years old (Siegel, 1999). There’s therefore a relevant discovery that has been demonstrated by neuroscience, of two types of memory: the explicit or declarative one and the implicit one (Warrington, Weiskrants, 1974).

The explicit memory: cognitively experienced memories. It has a declarative, episodic and autobiographic form, connected to one’s own story and identity, and it permits the recall.

The implicit memory: affectively experienced memories in a procedural form.

For the explicit processes of thinking is essential the working memory, but it has limited capacity. It works with episodic, autobiographic and semantic contents. Its correlates are found in the dorsolateral frontal cortex regions.

There are many authors describing and using in their psychoanalytical clinical practice the concepts of removed and not-removed subconscious, some of them with more explicit reference to neurological substrates and research, and others being more loyal to the psychoanalytical categories. Let's think about Greenberg (2002), Ogden et al. (2006), Schore (2003), Siegel (2007; 2010), Stern (2004), etc. and their psychotherapies centred on affective problems (Panksepp, 2012). Some elaborations are explained.

Bion, for example (1997), hypostasized the existence of a subconscious as an inaccessible state of mind, whose contents have never been conscious and never represented. Here are the procedural memories, implicit and not declarative, and early traumas. Here is also the proto-mental system, as a state in which the physical and mental elaborations are undifferentiated (1961-1948).

Matte Blanco (1975, 1988) identifies two regulation principles: the generalization that makes the individual become collective, and symmetry that leads to a loss of asymmetry in relationships making the part and the whole identical.

There might be two different ways of functioning in the mind, that are variously composed: the asymmetric one that takes form in the conscious thought, in line with the Aristotelic logic, and the symmetric one that is more connected to emotions. Analogue proportions of symmetry and asymmetry would correspond to the different proportions of emotions and thoughts: the two processes may indeed be connected.

Thus, there might be a removed subconscious and a not-removed subconscious, but even the not-removed and symmetric one can be understood if it assumes

some features of identity, otherwise it would remain undefined. In the case of the removed subconscious, the frame is the classic one, in which there is still a narrative plot that takes into consideration the spatial-temporal parameters and the logic. There are censures, resistances and counter-investments, but also symbolical associative references, that permit to approach the removed contents. In the case of the not-removed subconscious, the experience wouldn't be structured or thought and the analyst's aim would be to support a (partial) integration between symmetric and asymmetric parts.

Next to Matte Blanco's symmetric logic, there is Mancia's concept of subconscious. Early intersubjective and sensorial experiences would settle in the implicit memory of the unremoved subconscious. This one might be active since the very beginning of life, based on cerebral circuits that mature at an early stage, like the amygdala, the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, the cingulate cortex, the insula and the temporal-parietal-occipital cortex of the right hemisphere, but it would be impossible to recall its contents.

Later experiences with traumatic characteristics, could find place only in this type of memory because traumas are supposed to damage the hippocampus up to the atrophization of the neurons, making it impossible to access the explicit memory.

According to Mancia (2006, 2007), the early infantile and pre-infantile experiences themselves most mark the patient's sufferance and affect his life, the way of learning and his explicit memory, since between the two memories there might be a continuous flow of interrelations and mutual-conditioning. In order to access these experiences, lodged in the implicit memory and not predisposed to declarative recall, but able to traumatically operate on the patient's life, specific analysis' instruments exist, like the voice – which refers to the first new-born's experiences and to his first emotions -, the infra-verbal experiences, the dreams' fragments, the olfactory experiences.

All these elements become part of the transfer: the experiences archived in the implicit memory will be emotionally lived again in the transfer (and represented in the dreams), whose interpretation is the main key of the analytical work, according to Mancia.

Some of its inevitable steps are the recovery of the removed subconscious and the synchronic and asynchronic reconstruction of the patient's story. Mancia writes "In the view of these considerations, the critical component of the psychoanalytical therapeutic action seems to involve the symbolical transformation and the verbalization of early and unconscious implicit structures of the patient's mind. These are experiences full of emotive contents and rooted in the style of attachment typical of the primary relationships, and they also affect the speech and the prosodic tone of the voice, more than the way they affect the autobiographical memories dated back to the periods subsequent to preverbal ages. Making the patient's implicit structures thinkable, together with his unconscious functioning modalities, also means making him able to imagine the unimaginable of his removed subconscious and recovering the parts of the self that were denied or split and projected in the early ages of his mind's development" (pp. 641, 2006).

Also Civitarese agrees to the idea of a not-removed and not directly knowable subconscious, which can only be discovered through its derivatives. Like the removed memories push to come to consciousness, so the symbolization deficits, connected to some autistic or psychotic features of personality, push to be pre-representable and give a direct testimony of themselves as "disturbs of the sensorial body of the setting" and as "directed discharge in the form of behaviour". The patient's difficulties can be showed in the lack of alpha functioning, that is the apparatus capable of thinking and dreaming and that leads to difficulties in the proto-sensory transformations of the beta-elements in images (like it happens in autism), but in other cases, a sufficiently developed mind might

find complications in front of an excessive flow of sensory (typical of delusional or hallucinatory experiences) (Civitarese, 2013, pp. 12)

The key of access is a particular type of *rêverie*, characterized by hallucinations or sensorial strength. It is a matter of reliving the early stages, when the mind hadn't wholly taken office in the body and the sensorial part was predominant. The analyst must be willing to host and transform in his own mind the disturbing contents of the patient. The analysis thus becomes a "continuously expanding field of transformation", leading to the future or to the past that live in the present even as a negative element, more than to the reconstruction of the past itself.

The contribute of W. Bucci places itself in an area of integration between psychoanalysis and cognitivism.

The author identifies three different modalities of mind functioning: subsymbolical, non-verbal symbolical and verbal symbolical. The subsymbolical system might be compared to Freud's primary process, to Matte Blanco's symmetric and to Bion's protomental (Solano, 2016), including aspects of the body functioning, implicit memory, procedural memory and attentional physiological levels. Even if it's not symbolical, it contains a form of organization.

The three systems have correspondent cerebral correlates, but it is believed that the consciousness is not connected in itself to the localization, rather is a quality that is not exclusive and permanent in any system. Thus, the subsymbolical system, which generally operates in an implicit, automatic and not intentional modality, could occasionally become conscious, and in the same way, the verbal system might also function out of the awareness and in relation to the contents that are elaborated (Bucci, 1977).

In particular, it is interesting, and in disagreement with what has been suggested by other authors, that the implicit elaboration set up by the subsymbolical system could become conscious, without transit through other systems. Potentially, even what takes place in our body might become conscious. The body can be placed in the subsymbolical system, but it's the idea of a body that doesn't coincide with the biological aspects, and that is not contraposed to the mind, but in continuity with it. It's a body "that feels, that suffers, that rejoices" (pp. 59, Solano).

For this, in coherence with Bucci's theory, also the transfer and counter-transfer effects may have somatic features and be communicated: for example, an emotion in its expression of subsymbolical activity could be transmitted to the therapists and expressed in himself with somatic features, before becoming a psychic experience translatable in words (De Toffoli, 2014).

"If the unconscious meaning related to a somatic evidence by definition can't access the consciousness of the person who shows the symptom, however it can access the consciousness of another person, thanks to the transfer and counter-transfer effects, actually communicating, if not intentionally, the psychosomatic plot of the relationship that the symptom simultaneously hides and shows" (De Toffoli, 2001).

But even out of the context of the analysis, a body awareness could be considered before words. For example, this can happen with the beginning of a new life with pregnancy or maybe with the beginning of an abnormal proliferation of cells in cancer, or degeneration of other cells in neurologic pathologies. In our culture, it can be judged pretty unlikely, but at least in pregnancy there are testimonies of this "knowledge of the body". Women that are not aware of their pregnancy are surprised of how many pregnant women they see or of their strange capacity of noting puericulture books or baby shops. What usually happens in the analytic context is way more reliable than anecdotes. For example, during a child analysis, from the behaviour of the young patient, namely from his action of opening

drawers to see their contents, the analyst thought about a pregnancy of the baby's mother. The woman, still not aware of her state, did not confirm, but retracted during the following encounter. In this conceptual frame, we can think that the information related to the pregnancy could be present in the subsymbolical functioning and that it could be possibly expressed through unconscious sensorial modalities, which have been recognized by the first son.

Even in Bucci's perspective some censures, or better, breaks, are readable and these can determine pathologies or indicate a not-optimal functioning, since the health seems connected to the possibility that the three systems could be linked (referential connections).

The connections between systems are never complete, but normal dissociations exist that are functional, whereas other are pathological in different degrees. Namely, we may find them between the verbal and non-verbal systems, with a dissociation between words and emotional schemes, and a more serious one between symbolical and subsymbolical systems, that is between the arousal and the prototypic image. The dissociations can be primary when a connection has never been formed before, or secondary when the connection, yet partial, is obstructed by a repression.

Here is an interesting point of contact with Solms' theorization and the concept of automation of non-adaptive solutions, since a way of managing the arousal is represented by the creation (not that adaptive, here) of spurious connections.

Another point of contact in the clinical practice can be found in the utility of staying for a bit at a subsymbolical level: the already cited psychoanalytical authors, indeed, leave the patient a long period before guiding him to a verbal level, or at least at a symbolical level.

We need to specify, continuing in Bucci's theoretical frame, that the support the patient can receive is in the direction of a more efficient regulation of his affective arousal derived from the dissociation, but this doesn't mean that the dissociation must be necessarily faced.

In the psychoanalytic environment there are different positions about this. There is a good accordance on the fact that the change in analysis must also involve the implicit procedural memory, reaching the experiences that precede the verbal symbolical capacities; there's agreement on the fact that the reconstruction of the past nor the awareness of the patient on himself are the central elements, but actually, although the authors recognize that the patient could live a long phase in which he experiments a sensorial functioning, the subsymbolical dimension still remains fundamental. The trajectory remains anchored, I think, to the transition from the beta elements in alpha, or at least from proto-sensorial elements in images, the transition from scattered, confounded, homogenous and unlimited to finite, coherent and ordinate data. As a matter of fact, what happens is that the patient "recovers the words and the capacities to represent" (Civitaresse, 2016).

In Bucci's theory, since the connection between systems is promoted, there's an implication that the experiences could become speakable with words, but, while in other theorizations the possibility of making conscious, thinkable and speakable the experience seems to signal a higher point of elaboration, in Bucci's it's more shaded, because what is elaborated by the systems don't transit, siphoning itself in the next one, but rather connects itself; it stays in the different systems that communicate between each other. It's kind of like the aim was to have an ampler and fuller contact with the experience and not the choice of refining an exclusive instrument for reading it.

We could say that in general, in the theorizations that have been reported so far, there seems to be an agreement on the importance of the preverbal, implicit procedural memories, but a "resistance" in leaving the primacy to the words, to

representations and maybe to consciousness. Perhaps, an element on which it could be useful to have a more precise position is the representation of mind and body. If we think that in our road of evolution the mind had to “settle in the body”, we could not recognize the body the same dignity the mind has, but not even processes of organization and construction. Only if we think that the body and the mind form themselves in their reciprocal relation, we can accept that also the body can be known through that relation and that it also becomes part of the analytical process, through a transfer and counter-transfer effects that can also be sensorial or subsymbolical (Solano, 2016).

Precisely on this level, De Toffoli’s work can be placed, who, for example, in the case of Eugenio, lives his gestation with the patient that for nine months sleeps during the sessions. The attention of the therapist is moved from the silence to the variations of rhythm, time and intensity of the breath activity of the patient, to the perception of the air flow between the patient and the analyst. “I could see the analyst’s thought entering the patient’s biological matter, assisting to the immediate *transformation of something from the psychic state of one to the somatic state of the other*, and vice versa, testifying the two faces of the breathing process: one inherent to the vegetative life, the other to the life of the relation, first image of an active model of exchange” (De Toffoli, 2009, pp. 295). There are no word here: there’s body.

An original point of view is proposed from the more recent considerations of the affective neurosciences. The main idea is that the comprehension of the affections is the weightiest and most central point, since the personal structures are deeply rooted in themselves and not in the cognition. Pasksepp in particular upholds as the basis of every psychic activity, both conscious and unconscious, an ancestral nucleus of emotional consciousness. This affective proto-knowledge would

depend on the activity of deep and philologically ancient cerebral areas, named “core-self” or nuclear self.

He identifies seven core emotional systems, common also to animals: Seeking, Panic, Fear, Rage, Passion, Care, Play.

Panksepp hypostasizes, on the base of anatomical and experimental data, that the emotional systems of the primary process have a key role both in the functioning of the nuclear self - the systems of the medial line of the brain furnish, according to the author, to all the mammals a universal nuclear self (nomothetic). - and in the formation of the different ideological selves, that constitute in the learning processes with the involvement of superior cortical structures. “...we have proposed that the affections are created when the systems of the medial line assume different types of pattern of neuronal discharge at the time when different emotional circuits are activated” (Panksepp, Biven, 2014, pp. 454).

An anoetic, noetic and auto-noetic consciousness can be distinguished. The affections of the primary process are anoetic, not based on a cognitive consciousness, but insensitively conscious, in the sense that they are experienced in an affective form, not reflective. A fundamental point of this perspective is the rejection of the equation of consciousness and cognition and of the idea that all the affections are the result of an elaboration of neocortex and for this reason they are conscious. In the same way, even various aspects of memory and learning are considered not conscious. The cognitive and verbal abilities in this view wouldn't be necessary for the affective consciousness and, furthermore, the same superior cognitive activities would depend on subcortical systems. The comprehension of the mind cannot therefore circumvent the comprehension of its own ancestral forms. The affections associated to the emotional, homeostatic and sensorial experiences settle on deep subcortical regions. Panksepp doesn't exclude that in the course of the development superior cerebral structure might intervene, but in the first phase of the child development the elaboration is borne by the inferior

structure. Therefore, the most challenging experiences in the development, both in a positive and in a negative way, have been elaborated by primitive structures and memorized before the maturation of the episodic-autobiographic memory.

Therefore, there is a strict relationship between these neural circuits that generate the raw affections and the manifestation of emotional-instinctive expressions, including complex motorial functions, which determine, for example, the survival of animals. We can note a point of contact with Bucci's theory that defines the motor functions and visceral, vegetative activities and the raw affections in the subsymbolical mental system.

In accordance with this, the aim of the psychotherapies will not be a change in the cognitive contents, but the modification of the patient's affective experiences; for this purpose, the instrument of the cognitive interpretation is not always the ideal one, especially in the serious pathologies.

Paksepp considers different therapeutic approaches with a significantly large point of view, sharing Daniel Siegel's consideration, according to whom the exact way in which the mind changes during the therapeutic process is the fundamental puzzle that the linkage between neurosciences and psychotherapies tries to face. The author therefore thinks that different psychotherapeutic models (from the behavioural therapy to the cognitive approaches and to the different analytically-oriented psychotherapies), may be integrated with the comprehension of the affective systems. Considering a continuum body-brain-body, even the somatic therapies can have a significant role. The utility of the pharmacology is furthermore recognized, from the transcranial magnetic stimulation and deep cerebral stimulation. The body-based therapy, as proposed by Pat Ogden et al. (2016), who also ideated the Sensorimotor Psychotherapy, and the EDMR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reconsolidation) of Francine Shapiro (2001) are also considered.

Briefly, the approaches based on the affective balance can better integrate all these psychotherapy proposals, by combating the “affective chains” with “positive affective towing” and proposing the systems of Research, Care, Passion and Play. An essential element is the quality of the therapeutic relationship, of the human encounter in which one can experience, with Rogers’ expression, a positive unconditional acceptance of the cited affectional systems.

The main idea is to “pack up” in a “nice affectional and positive wrapping paper” both negative and traumatic memories, aiming at the possibility of reconsolidation.

In this perspective, also the cognitive awareness is not excluded, but it is not the key element.

The theorization of Solms winds on a similar level. According to this author, the consciousness states aren’t intrinsically affective, whereas the perceptive elaborations of the neocortex are not normally conscious.

Indeed, what for Freud is the Ego, for Solms is intrinsically unconscious and may become conscious when the Id is activated. We become aware of our needs via feelings. Also from a neurological point of view there’s a hierarchal relation between the affections and the perceptions for which the cortical consciousness is dependent on ERTAS arousal.

The part of the brain that performs the functions that Freud attributed to the Id, the part that generates drives and instincts, and functions according to the “pleasure principle” is conscious” (Solms 2013). “In fact, it is the fount of all consciousness: the very basis of our sentient being. In my view, the fundamental stuff of consciousness is not perception (as Freud claimed) but rather arousal” (Solms, pp.1, 2017). Also in evolutionary terms, it seems of primary importance to have a consciousness that records the state of the subject, more than the one of the outer world.

In agreement with the observation for which the 95% of our goal-directed activities are executed unconsciously, Solms states that all non falsified predictions, unless and until prediction error arises, are automatically. Indeed, it's from the predicted error and from the following uncertainty and dissatisfaction of the need that the pre-conscious predictions can become salient and the memory's traces are activated. The ERTAS excitation can produce the level of activation necessary to reconsolidation, which permits the updating of the precedent predictions.

Therefore, the correct predictions are "sanely" automatized transiting through the working memory (conscious) and the innate previsions. We may say that these constitute the cognitive subconscious, that is the legitimately automatized subconscious; whereas the illegitimately or prematurely automatized previsions constitute the dynamic subconscious (Solms, 2013). This legitimate automatization have place when the Ego has not sufficient resources to face the problem, which therefore becomes unsolvable. It's interesting to highlight that in Solm's thought this can be a good solution, even though not optimal. The repression can allow the subject to use his energies in a more efficient way, more than struggling with an unsolvable problem. We must remember that the working memory (when the activity of "thinking" takes place) has a limited capacity.

Also here, as in Panksepp's, the criterion of subject's health or wellness arises, also at the expenses of the consciousness.

After all, in Freud's, to face the repression meant to face the subject's sufferance too, which is (also) connected to "the return of the repressed", whereas for Solms it's not the repression that comes back, but only the affection, the outcome of a wrong prediction. Differently from the Freudian theorization of 1926 of the anguish as a signal, Solms puts a terminological distinction between "repression" and "defence", to reflect the primacy of repression.

“In contrast, my view is that the defences (ranging from neurotic substitute formation, through narcissistic splitting, to psychotic disavowal) are all secondary attempts to deal with the emotions that repressed predictions fail to regulate, by definition. In this formulation, the predictions that constitute secondary defences are therefore closer to consciousness than repression is; they are less deeply automatized. This makes them easier to shift in analysis. Indeed, in my experience, some defences are not unconscious at all. Defences are the patient’s solution to the (conscious) problem of the return of the repressed (...). No thinking occurs, not even unconsciously. This leads to endless, mindless repetition; which is why “transfer” is so important. The patients cannot rethink the repressed directly, but they can think about what they are doing now in consequence of the repressed. What the patients can think about – can re-problematize, if it is brought to their attention – is the repetitive derivatives of the repressed, which involve current cortical representations (current experiences), which can therefore enter working memory and declarative (and reflexive) thinking. This allows them to be reconnected with the affects that belong to them – which enables the Ego to come up with better predictions, with more realistic action plans, with the help of an adult mind (and analyst). These contrasts with the model of therapeutic action associated with Freud’s final model of the mind, in which the goal was undoing repression to allow for repressed psychic representations of a drive derivative to be re-connected to the drive derivatives originally associated with them, and for greater integration of the Ego as a result of correcting the expulsion from the Ego which resulted from repression”. (pp. 49-50, 2018)

The analyst’s responsibility is to work on repetitive derivatives of the repressed - which involves cortical representations (of current experiences), which can therefore enter working memory and declarative (and reflexive; i.e., frontal lobe) – and help the patient making better previsions, more realistic plans of action. The analyst also uses the interpretation of the transfer effect, but it’s evident that the

perspective is not the Strackey's one (1939): Solms, talking about a tough work that must be done later, has not expectations on the changeable strength of these interpretations. He writes in fact that " after transference "interpretation," comes the hard work of "working through," since the establishment of new procedural memories is a slow process" (Smith, Solms, 2018 pp. 50).

Before concluding this absolute partial and summary slideshow that had the aim of individuating some lines of development in regards to censorship, we specify that even staying inside the psychoanalysis, there are different voices of people that, especially if taking care of really suffering patients, have emphasised the utility of a different approach, not based on the interpretation nor articulated on the conscious level. In this view, the ones defined as unspecific factors of psychoanalysis are valorised, the containment of the patient, the relationship, the experienced-sharing (Rossi Monti, 2005). Namely, we cannot fail to remember Recamier who transposed the psychoanalytic interpretation in gestures and speaking acts, recognizing that we are used to use words because they are cheaper than actions, but words are often less efficient for the most suffering patients.

Therefore, there are different paths that lead to the conviction that the consciousness and the word could not have that relevance that so far have been attributed to them and that the goal of the therapy is to help people feel better, or as Recamier says, to make possible for the patients to live and to stand a conflictual world.

The social perspective

We would like to conclude trying to combine some lines and themes emerged at the level of the psychology-psychoanalytic reflection with what we can observe at a social level.

Considering the theme in ampler terms, we could link the renege of the classic concept of censorship, thought as the dynamic relation between distinct parts (intra-individual or inter-personal, social), to the establishment of an idea of the world, channelled by the epistemology of the complexity, as a reality that is not already defined, but that is rather continuously generating and organizing itself, that comprehends in itself the idea of variations, dispersion, accident, creative potentialities, irrational, rational, mystery, order. In more specific psychological terms, we may connect the waning of the censorship concept to the awareness that the identity construction asks for a time and for an effort that are more complex than what was thought and that the outcomes of this process don't lead to a solid and monolithic identity.

From a social point of view, this appears clearly in the virtual identity, which can exist on the momentary desire and without constraints with facts of reality. The same coordinates on which our thought, the space and time were based are fragmented, distorted not only at a theoretical level, but also in the direct experience. It's difficult to understand if and where the borders are, being them geographical or personal or represented by distinctions between reality and fantasy, between true and false.

In this uncertainty, it is understandable that the need of protecting spaces of wellness is established and we have emphasized how the orientation of the psychotherapies is not directed at comprehending everything, but to equipping the patient so that he could live a sufficiently good life. How can this be translated at a social level? I think this translation asks for a consideration in ethic terms. Good can be the protection of one's own backyard, the prosecution of the greater good (which good?) in the short term, but, assuming in the positive valence the absence of borders, the good can be the collective one, of everyone and of the planet.

Another consonance between individual and collective can be identified on the historical level, in the optimism of the dawn of psychoanalysis as of the start of

Internet. In both there was the illusion of eliminating censorship: in psychoanalysis there was the perspective of making conscious what was unconscious and at a social level it was thought that Internet would have permitted to eliminate every form of control and censure of information. Now, psychoanalysis is more measured with the opposite question, that is not why something is unconscious, but why a part of our mental process (that appears increasingly reduced) becomes conscious. For what regards the web, there's a discrete awareness of limitations of web access: gates of interconnection for accessing the web (e.g., Great Firewall), filtering software denying the access to undesirable websites, slowing of social networks, limited episodes of total obscuration of Internet. There's less awareness for the "censures" that are everyday acted "in our home", not in other countries, through a subtler way of censorship (because often convenient), that is the selection of information, acted through the individualization of the features and the preferences of the user and his relationships circle.

Perhaps in a paradoxical way, we may say that censorship in Internet is connected to the (excessive) availability of information. There's a potential access to a boundless multitude of information (big data) and a real impossibility to use it, because time - and mind - instead have boundaries. Therefore, there's a possibility to obscure in the "too much"- here we could find a correspondence with what happens at the individual level, when the difficulty of elaboration has to do with an excessive flow of sensoriality.

An analogy may be identified also between the automatization of imperfect solutions, on account of unavailability of personal resources to face the task and for an objectively reduced space of the working memory, and, at a social level, the summary or uncritical assumption of information.

The diffusion of fake news, the inaccuracies or distortions of information, the construction of defamation campaigns, actually presuppose that their users or

readers have no time (or resources) to accurately value, compare, reflect, ample their sources and question themselves. Especially when what is read strengthens one's own thought and confirms the subject (or the group) in the goodness (with the risk of universality!) of their own perspective, it doesn't leave space to the doubt and the reassuring certainty is embraced.

Another need is here intertwined: the one of not to upset, even without dissonant thoughts. This need finds his culmination in the "politically correct". Here the attention not to create inconveniences, disturbances, not to affect one's ethic, religious, political sensitivity finds its maximum expression. But this is censorship. And the implicit assumption is worrying, namely that the affections, the contrasts, the comparisons cannot be managed, but they must be preventively sedated, foreseen, silenced. This doesn't mean on the other hand that clashes, even violent, very heated debates cannot be "staged", but they are actually unlistenable. They are yelled slogan, like in a play whose outcome will be the one of not changing anything, not being contaminated by any new thought. An already written outline low in formation and information.

Here is evident that the problem that seem proposed on a cognitive level, we could say informational, declaratory, has many other origins. We could remind how at the base of any psychic action, being it conscious or unconscious, is an ancestral nucleus of emotional knowledge, but, with a concept shared by everyone, it would be enough to remember how our mind is built in our relations. We may therefore say that our true resource at our disposal to fight censures, any form they assume, is to grow up our mind, not necessarily looking for spaces of freedom, but rather building spaces of relation, of cognitive confrontation and affective encounter.

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