




What explains political trust in Latin America? Understanding the role of the urban-rural divide

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the determinants of political trust in Latin America, focusing on the urban-rural divide. Using data from the 2019 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for eighteen countries, we analyze five dimensions of trust: trust in the president, Parliament, political parties, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the police. In contrast to most developed countries, political trust in Latin America is systematically higher in rural than in urban areas. To explain this pattern, we estimate ordered logit models for urban and rural subsamples and apply an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to separate compositional from context-specific effects. Education and income are consistently negatively associated with political trust, suggesting that higher socioeconomic status is linked to more demanding expectations, particularly in urban contexts. Changes in household income also matter: improvements increase trust, while deterioration significantly reduces it. Crime victimization and perceived insecurity are key drivers of lower trust, especially in cities, contributing to an “urban penalty.” The decomposition shows that about half of the urban-rural gap is explained by differences in observable characteristics, while the remainder reflects unexplained, place-specific factors. These results point to two contrasting dynamics: reducing urban insecurity may generate “upward convergence” in trust, whereas improving rural socioeconomic conditions alone may produce “downward convergence” by raising expectations. Overall, narrowing spatial gaps in trust does not necessarily strengthen democratic legitimacy, underscoring the need for policies that address both urban vulnerabilities and institutional performance.

1. Introduction

In recent years, political scientists have investigated, both conceptually and empirically, the notion of political trust. Norris (2017) defines political trust as an attitude comprising both confidence in institutions and approval of the incumbent office-holders. The concept is different from both pure trust in democratic institutions and pure political support or incumbent approval. It applies also to non-elected agencies, but it is influenced by partisan views through one's alignment with the majority currently on power. Political trust is a notion that suits well the analysis of survey data, as it is well documented that respondents find it hard to single out pure institutional trust, and questions are often unclear (Linde and Eckman, 2003).

High political trust is known to be beneficial for the well-functioning of democracy: it is a resource enabling government action (Keefer and

Scartascini, 2022). Especially when government action implies personal risk or sacrifice, trust in government serves as a heuristic for believing that future positive outcomes will materialize (Citrin and Stoker, 2018). On the other hand, political distrust signals a weakening of democratic foundations, as it erodes institutional legitimacy and citizens' support for democratic governance (Christensen, 2016). The recent rise in political polarization can be seen as both a cause and a consequence of declining trust. Accordingly, the literature on political trust is closely linked to that on populism, as low trust undermines collective accountability and facilitates support for populist or low-quality governance (Vlaicu, 2018).

This literature has often also considered whether there is a systematic difference in political trust between urban and rural contexts. From a theoretical perspective, the relevance of this divide has been linked to spatially uneven economic development, access to public services, and

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perceptions of political responsiveness, situating the discussion on urban–rural differences in political trust within the broader literature on “left-behind places” and the geography of discontent (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).

The first aim of this contribution is to shed light on the drivers of political trust in Latin America through regression analysis, with particular attention to differences between the rural and urban contexts. Latin America remains a relatively underexplored region in this field, despite exhibiting low and declining average levels of political trust (Bargsted et al., 2017; Parra Saiani et al., 2024). Notably, the region is characterised by lower levels of trust in urban areas, a pattern that sharply contradicts the evidence on developed countries (McKay et al., 2023).

Our second aim is to distinguish and analyse the compositional effects and idiosyncratic features that characterise differences in political trust between Latin American urban and rural areas. Recent contributions to the rural-urban divide in political attitudes emphasise the need to disentangle compositional from contextual or idiosyncratic effects (e.g. García del Horno et al., 2024; Kenny and Luca, 2021). Empirically, this literature approaches contextual effects by including observable territorial variables or absorbing residual differences through fixed effects, thereby identifying a remaining place-based component after controlling for composition. In this perspective, differences in trust may depend not only on individual endowments, but also on less tangible factors that are difficult to formally account for. We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to assess the relative importance of these components, explicitly quantifying the contribution of both compositional and idiosyncratic effects and contributing to unpacking the geography of political trust in Latin America.

We use data coming from the 2019 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). We consider the following dimensions of political trust: trust in the president, trust in Parliament, trust in political parties, trust in the Supreme Court of Justice, and trust in the police. Petrarca et al. (2022) distinguish between institutional and actor-centred trust: the former is captured by trust in Parliament, the latter by trust in parties. However, this approach, meant to isolate trust in institutions from trust in the incumbent, does not suit well the presidential system in force in the large majority of Latin American countries, and therefore we do not follow it. Instead, we consider all types of trust as dimensions expressing different aspects of the same attitude. Including all of them in the analysis provides a complete picture of political trust.

Indeed, in Latin America, political trust is best conceived not as a single, “monolithic” attitude but as a bundle of institution-specific trusts whose determinants can differ across domains—e.g., evaluations of performance, corruption, public security, rule of law, and polarization/partisanship—so a disaggregated measurement strategy is consistent with the view of political legitimacy/support as multidimensional rather than a single scale and with extensive empirical work in the region (Booth and Seligson 2009). Since institutions perform different functions—representation and accountability (Parliament/parties), leadership and policy delivery (president), legal arbitration and rule-of-law guarantees (Supreme Court of Justice), and coercion and public order (police)—it is theoretically plausible that the same predictors have heterogeneous effects depending on the target institution, which is precisely why separating these trust dimensions strengthens inference.

Our data confirm that political trust is higher in rural areas in Latin America. Evidence on some of the most relevant drivers (education and income, both having a negative impact on political trust) reveals that this continent is very peculiar. Unlike in many developed nations, the “left behind” places are not rural in this context. Instead, they are the disadvantaged quarters of large cities. In these urban centers, residents face a “city penalty” where high expectations for public institutions and services clash with the reality (Jaitman, 2015; Angotti and Irazábal, 2017; World Economic Forum, 2025).

Our Oaxaca-Blinder exercise adds more insights into the rural-urban divide. In the majority of cases, about half of the difference in trust

between rural and urban respondents is explained by differences in characteristics such as crime, education and income. This uncovers a challenging trend where cities experience a penalty in trust from higher crime rates, while rural areas experience a socio-economic “delay”, with lower income and education levels that keep their trust levels high. However, this exercise also highlights the fact that, for most dimensions of political trust, more than half of their difference in levels when considering urban and rural areas is not explained by the large number of variables we consider. This calls for more research on the reasons why the urban-rural divide should matter.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an overview of the main contributions on the determinants of political trust, and in the differences in trust documented in urban and rural contexts; Section 3 describes key socio-economic evolution and characteristics of Latin America, with an emphasis on their spatial dimension, and presents our hypotheses; Section 4 describes the data and the methodology implemented; Section 5 shows and discusses the results; and Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature review

According to Mishler and Rose (2001), there are several explanations for the difference in the level of political trust at the individual level. According to the so-called cultural approach, there is an association between social and political trust, in such a way that different levels of the former trigger differences in the latter. Instead, the institutional approach refers to the correlation between political trust and the ability of the political system to perform in a satisfactory way. In addition, McKay et al. (2023) identify three other determinants of political trust at the individual level: perception of competence (including ability to provide public services); perception of integrity (the opposite of integrity, i.e. involvement in scandals, is considered also by Poertner and Zhang, 2023), and perception of benevolence, i.e. the extent to which those in office seem to care about one’s own well-being and act in one’s interests.

The rural-urban divide comes into the picture as individual attitudes and perceptions may be influenced by the geographical context and its history. The empirical investigations focusing on whether there is a systematic difference in political trust between urban and rural contexts have produced contrasting evidence. In particular, the evidence based on datasets collected in developed countries highlights that political trust is lower in rural areas, while the contrary is true when one considers developing countries, although the latter have been considered less frequently.

Studies investigating the European context point to lower levels of trust in government and satisfaction with democracy in rural and underpopulated areas (Kenny and Luca, 2021; Mitsch et al., 2021; Lago, 2022). In a case study on Norway, Stein et al. (2021) find that peripheral regions tend to experience lower levels of trust than the urban ones. Similarly, McKay et al. (2021) show that people living outside the city and in rural areas in UK have low levels of trust in government, mainly due to bad economic conditions and social marginalisation. Tomaney et al. (2024) investigate the same context through the lens of ethnography. They find that these places, once mining and industrialised areas, are especially affected by the disappearance of social infrastructure, i.e. commercial and non-commercial premises enhancing the sense of being part of a community. Recent research further shows that access to public services can shape political trust and electoral behaviour. For instance, evidence from Denmark shows that local school and hospital closures reduce electoral support for incumbents at the local level and increase support for right-wing populist parties in both local and national elections (Nyholt, 2024). Evidence from Germany indicates that persistent inaccessibility to public transport and hospitals is strongly associated with lower trust in government, particularly in historically disadvantaged regions (Stroppe, 2023). Salomo (2019) investigates the East Germany state of Thuringia and finds that there is a significant

conditional correlation between its districts' socio-economic context and democratic discontent, also (but not exclusively) mediated by the influence of living in a place on one's perceived deprivation. Garcia del Horno et al. (2024) examine the rural–urban divide on political efficacy, namely on the perceptions of whether political elites respond to the citizens' demand. They find that in Europe rural residents systematically show lower external political efficacy than urban residents, which is partly explained by differences in sociodemographic characteristics of the two groups, but not by differences in public service provision. The urban-rural gap in political efficacy indeed reduces as rural residents are better represented in national parliaments, supporting the key role of institutions. As for the evidence based on data from the developing world, Brinkerhoff et al. (2018) assess trust in government in 17 African countries and find that people living far from urban centres tend to have higher levels of trust in government, in spite of their low satisfaction with public services. Similar results come from China where, despite the levels of trust are generally high across the whole population, Wang and You (2016) find that people living in rural areas experience higher trust in government. Regarding Latin American countries, Bland et al. (2023) show that the further away people are from urban centres, the less likely they are to translate dissatisfaction with services into political voice. Their study focuses on *approval of government*. However, the latter has been found to be only one part of the story when it comes to political trust (McKay et al., 2023).

The mediating role of the level of development in the relationship between the urban-rural divide and political trust has been justified by different authors in different ways. One of the narratives is about public services. Higher quality (generally in cities) is expected to be positively correlated with public satisfaction, which in turn fosters trust in government. If this is true, rural areas should be characterised by lower trust in government. However, as already highlighted by Bland et al. (2023), in developing countries the story might be different: poor or no service delivery might trigger lower expectations from government and no impact on perceived competence. Perceived integrity may be higher in rural areas for the same reason (little contact with government makes it unlikely to question its integrity), and/or clientelistic practices at the local level may matter even more.

McKay et al. (2023) are the only ones using data from both developed and developing countries, and they find no statistical significance for the impact of the urban-rural divide on political trust at the world level. However, their regressions by continents show that impact is heterogeneous: in Western Europe, Canada, and Australasia rural areas are associated with lower levels of trust, while the opposite holds for the developing world. This confirms that developed and developing countries are two different stories, which has to do with the different evolution in time of the socio-economic conditions of urban and rural areas here and there. The peculiarities of Latin America in this respect are notable, and the next section is therefore devoted to them.

3. Socio-economic background and transformations in Latin America

In the last years, Latin America witnessed protests and social unrest, especially in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and demand for change, for improvement in the quality of democracy, for social mobility and for fight against certain actions taken by governments implying infringement of human rights, shortages of food, fuel, and other fundamental issues. Although these protests were rooted in specific political circumstances and episodes of corruption and injustice, they can also be considered as broader expressions of frustration with the unmet promises of achieving better living conditions and better public services (Rojas, 2021).

In this context, declining political trust has become a key concern for both scholars and policymakers. Structural transformations experienced by the region over the past two decades provide an important backdrop to these dynamics. During the commodity price boom, the middle class doubled in size, reaching one third of the population by the end of 2014,

when the boom came to an end (Gruss, 2014). However, after 2014 most of the people who had moved out of poverty jumped into an economically vulnerable group with considerable risk of falling back into it, as they were unable to meet class transitions towards more stable and better job conditions (Ferreira et al., 2013; Stampini et al., 2016). This social group largely benefitted from public social programmes at first, but, since the end of the commodity boom, they have been affected by government expenditures' shrink (Biekart, 2015).

These socio-economic processes have unfolded unevenly across space. Latin America is one of the most urbanized regions in the world: the share of population living in urban areas raised from 70.7% in 1990 to 80.7% in 2018, with 50% of the inhabitants living in cities with more than 1 million people (UNDP, 2019). This has been accompanied by a strong concentration of wealth, given that urban areas are far more productive and less poor than rural areas (Scott, 2019). At the same time, however, urban inequality remains high, and poverty and extreme poverty have grown relatively more in urban than in rural areas (ECLAC, 2019). World Bank data show that the Gini coefficient is higher in cities:¹ the index decreased until 2014 and then stabilized. A similar trend is observed in the share of urban population living in slums, informal settlements, or inadequate housing.²

Rapid urbanisation in Latin America has not been matched by adequate urbanisation policies, resulting in cities with high levels of socio-economic segregation and great inequalities in access to public services (UN-HABITAT, 2017). Evidence from major metropolitan areas such as Santiago, Mexico city and Lima shows strong patterns of residential segregation, with high income groups spatially concentrated in specific districts and clear territorial separation from lower-income populations (Rodríguez and Arriagada, 2004). Rural areas, on the other hand, continue to display lower educational levels, and higher levels of informal employment, child mortality rate and child labour, among other problem (Scott, 2019).

These structural disparities suggest that the experience of economic and institutional change may differ substantially between urban and rural populations.

These developments have implications for political trust. The rapid expansion of the middle class during the commodity boom generated expectations of continued social mobility and improvements in public services. When economic growth slowed and these expectations were not fully met, frustration may have emerged among relatively better-off groups. Individuals with higher levels of education and income tend to develop greater expectations regarding government performance and institutional quality. If institutions fail to meet these expectations, political trust may decline. From this theoretical reasoning we derive our first hypothesis:

(H1). Higher levels of education and income are associated with lower levels of political trust in Latin America.

In addition to current socio-economic conditions, recent changes in individuals' economic situations may influence their perceptions of political institutions. Individuals experiencing improvements in their economic conditions may become more attentive to government performance, while those facing deterioration may perceive institutions as failing to protect their well-being. In both cases, changes in economic trajectories may shape how citizens evaluate the performance and credibility of political authorities.

This reasoning leads to our second hypothesis:

(H2). Recent changes in personal income are associated with political trust.

Differences between urban and rural areas in Latin America also involve non-economic factors, including crime, with the emergence of

¹ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/income-in-equality/urban-rural-inequality> (Last access: 28/07/2023)

² <https://consensomontevideo.cepal.org/en/node/212> (Last access: 28/07/2023)

“pockets of fragility”, meaning cities or territories where populations face extremely weak state capacity and become vulnerable to organized crime or alternative forms of governance and service provision led by criminals (IDB, 2024). This may lead to the extreme consequence of the creation of narco-cities (narco-ciudades), a form of criminal enclave that can arise from drug wars and urban criminal conflict. They consist of urban areas—ranging from small cities to neighborhoods within large metropolitan regions—where criminal cartels or gangs involved in drug trafficking and other illicit activities exercise control or compete for territorial dominance (Sullivan, 2022). These circumstances lead to our third hypothesis:

(H3). Among urban residents, unsafety perception connected with crime is negatively associated with political trust.

In addition to this, institutional and contextual factors may reinforce differences in political trust across geographical settings. Poorer populations in Latin America have historically had limited expectations regarding the state’s capacity to deliver welfare and public services (Holland, 2018). Limited contact with formal institutions reduces the likelihood that individuals critically evaluate government competence or integrity. In rural areas, trust may be further supported by patronage networks and local political relationships that shape perceptions of benevolence (Bland et al., 2023). Many of these contextual factors are difficult to measure in survey data. As a result, our fourth and last hypothesis is the following:

(H4). Even after controlling for observable individual characteristics such as education, income, recent changes in economic conditions and perception of crime, differences in political trust between urban and rural populations persist.

4. Data and methodology

4.1. Data

To conduct our analysis, we exploit data coming from the 2019 Latin American Public Opinion Project. The samples in each country were based on a multi-stage probabilistic design, and were stratified by major regions of the country, size of municipality and by urban and rural areas within municipalities.

We aim at representing many dimensions of political trust, thus we use different measures to approach it. These measures are crucial to understand how people feel about democracy itself and are based on their perceptions on how the institutions satisfy their normative expectations (Grönlund and Setälä, 2007). In particular, our outcome variables are the following: trust in president, trust in political parties, trust in Parliament, trust in the Supreme Court of Justice, and trust in the police, all evaluated on a 1-7 Lickert scale³. Trust in president is particularly salient, given that the large majority of the countries we consider are presidential republics.

As for our target variables, a first group of variables regards socio-economic conditions, as it is demonstrated that they influence trust in institutions (Arvanitidis et al., 2021). We include the income level but also a variable that the extant literature often neglects, namely the change in household income in the past 2 years (dummy variables for improving, worsening or remaining stable, the latter taken as a reference). Education, measured as schooling years, may be indicative of income expectations and is generally associated with a higher level of trust (Caldeira and Gibson, 1992; Hausegger and Riddell, 2004; Gibson et al., 2015; Crandall and Lawlor, 2022).

We also focus on the effect of safety perception vis a vis crime, as Blanco and Ruiz (2013) find that perceptions of insecurity, experiences of corruption and armed conflict contribute to increasing people’s

³ Correlations between these domains of trust are relatively weak, ranging from 0.25 to 0.47. Exceptions are the correlation between trust in the Supreme Court of Justice and trust in Parliament (0.60), and between trust in political parties and trust in Parliament (0.53).

distrust, which in turn harms social capital levels in Colombia. Our explanatory variables capture the experience of a violent crime in the past year and the perception of one’s neighbourhood as safe.

As for the political covariates, we consider four variables: interest in politics, affinity with any party position, perception of redistributive policies against inequality and importance of religion. While the first variable controls for the agents’ information set in the political domain, the other three are meant to capture ideological biases, with importance of religion capturing conservative political views as to moral issues. Petrarca et al. (2022) find a relationship between trust and voting for the parties currently in office. As a robustness check, given that the sample halves, we include a variable indicating if the respondent voted for a winning candidate in the last election.

We also consider the individual level of trust in people to proxy for the quality of interpersonal relations (Carreras and Bowler, 2013; Ross and Escobar-Lemmon, 2011) and in line with the cultural approach to political trust.

Finally, we include sex, age, number of children, occupation and ethnicity to account for personal characteristics of the respondents. We do not have a priori expectations for these variables, but we cannot a priori exclude some statistical association between them and political trust.

The whole sample consists of 21,490 observations from eighteen countries; around 16,000 respondents belong to urban areas, and around 5,000 to rural areas. The sample size varies depending on the outcome variable.

Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables. In our dataset, income is on average about 30% higher in urban areas, while the average number of school years is 25% higher there. Notice that also the dummies capturing changes in income have different mean values in the urban and rural subsamples, but close to each other: in urban areas, 23% respondents claim that their income increased, against 19% in rural areas, while 30% of respondents in urban areas declared that their income decreased, against the 33% in rural areas.

4.2. Methodology

Our first aim is to investigate the statistical significance of the association between political trust and our explanatory variables in the urban and rural subsamples. This allows to investigate whether the attributes associated to higher/lower political trust in the two contexts differ. We employ an ordered logit regression model to fully exploit the variability of our indexes of institutional trust, specified as follows:

$$\text{Political trust}_i = X\beta_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where i denotes the individual, *Political trust* is our outcome variable; X is the vector of individual characteristics; ε_i is the error term.

As second step we run the ordered logit model specified in Eq. (1) using the whole sample, and including a dummy denoting the residence in an urban area.

As third step, we implement an Oaxaca-Blinder (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) decomposition in order to investigate the potential role of the urban and rural specificities in our sample.

The average difference between the group of respondents living in the urban (U) and rural (R) context can be written, recalling Eq. (1), as:

$$\overline{\text{Pol.trust}}_{i,R} - \overline{\text{Pol.trust}}_{i,U} = \overline{X}_R \widehat{\beta}_{i,R} - \overline{X}_U \widehat{\beta}_{i,U} \quad (2)$$

If we sum and subtract for $\overline{X}_R \widehat{\beta}_{i,U}$ and we rearrange the terms we obtain:

$$\overline{\text{Pol.trust}}_{i,R} - \overline{\text{Pol.trust}}_{i,U} = (\overline{X}_R - \overline{X}_U) \widehat{\beta}_{i,U} + \overline{X}_R' (\widehat{\beta}_{i,R} - \widehat{\beta}_{i,U}) \quad (3)$$

However, this means that we are considering respondents living in the rural areas as “disadvantaged”, while the opposite may hold. As observed by Neumark (1988) among others, considerable variation may

Table 1

Mean values of trust variables in rural and urban areas.

	Rural Mean	Urban Mean	T-test
Trust in Parliament	3.5643	3.2767	***
Trust in political parties	2.8612	2.6134	***
Trust in president	3.6858	3.5332	***
Trust in Supreme Court of Justice	3.8042	3.5079	***
Trust in police	4.0460	3.7064	***

Note: *** p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

exist in the estimates one gets by changing the reference category. To avoid this, the author proposes the following generalization:

$$\overline{Pol.trust}_{i,R} - \overline{Pol.trust}_{i,U} = (\bar{X}_R - \bar{X}_U)' \hat{\beta}_i^* + [\bar{X}_R' (\hat{\beta}_{i,R} - \hat{\beta}_i^*) + \bar{X}_R' (\hat{\beta}_i^* - \hat{\beta}_{i,U})] \quad (4)$$

Where $\hat{\beta}_i^*$ is a nondiscriminatory vector of coefficients. Following Cotton (1988), $\hat{\beta}_i^*$ is obtained by weighting the coefficients by the group sizes. However, other weighting methods are also possible. As a benchmark we use Neumark (1988) weighing scheme according to which $\hat{\beta}_i^*$ is obtained from the coefficients from a pooled regression over both groups.

The first part of Eq. (4), i.e. $(\bar{X}_R - \bar{X}_U)' \hat{\beta}_i^*$, defines the differences due to the average characteristics of the two groups, which is called the explained part, compositional part or “endowments” effect. The second part of the equation, $[\bar{X}_R' (\hat{\beta}_{i,R} - \hat{\beta}_i^*) + \bar{X}_R' (\hat{\beta}_i^* - \hat{\beta}_{i,U})]$ defines the differences in the estimated coefficients of the two groups and represents the unexplained part, structural or “coefficient” effect. We will interpret this part as behavioural or idiosyncratic effects that operate through differences in attitudes, cultural values and tastes between rural and urban respondents (Arvanitidis et al., 2021)

This decomposition exercise allows us to investigate the counterfactual situation in which we understand how much of the differences could be reduced if the two groups came up with the same levels of the variable in question (Capuno, 2016). The main advantage of this method is that it produces estimates and statistical significance of the heterogeneous effects, distinguishing the differences in mean characteristics from the differences in their effects. Even though the limitation of this method is that it is not able to identify the causal channels of heterogeneity, the results can still provide policy-relevant insights (Capuno, 2016).

5. Results

Table 1 illustrates the mean values of all variables of interest calculated over the urban and rural subsamples; F-statistics are reported to allow assessment of the statistical significance of their difference. Notably, all variables proxying political trust have higher means in the rural subsample, and the differences in mean values are always significant.

We then estimate ordered logit models of our explanatory variables across the different dimensions of political trust, separately for the urban and rural subsamples, following Eq. (1) (Table 2).

A number of covariates show the same statistical significance and sign for (almost) all dimensions of trust both in the urban and rural context.⁴ In our opinion, the most notable evidence is that these include education and income: they are statistically significant and both with

⁴ This also is the case for the political variables. The relationship between political involvement and trust, as highlighted by Gabriel (2017), is a complex one. Our results show that a person without a party position has a lower political trust. The opposite holds for interest in politics. Another relevant variable is the perception of policies against inequality, which is associated to having a higher political trust. The opposite holds for “religion being perceived as not important”, in line with Daniels and Von Der Ruhr (2010) and Putnam (2000).

negative sign. This finding supports H1, indicating that higher levels of education and income are associated with lower political trust, consistent with status anxiety explanations in Latin America. It confirms that this region is peculiar: low political trust is a story of unmet expectations by the not-so-poor, a story of status anxiety. Regarding the two dummies expressing variation of income in the last years, we observe a negative sign for a decrease and a positive sign for an increase in income. This means that a recent worsening of individual economic conditions is associated with lower political trust, while a rising income helps people feeling more trustful and confident. These patterns confirm H2, indicating that recent changes in personal income influence political trust, aligning with the work by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) that points out that economic dynamics condition expectations of democracy and politics.⁵ Crime-related variables have the expected sign and play a non-negligible role in most specifications.

Our evidence also shows that some of the considered drivers play different roles in rural and urban areas. For instance, trust in people positively correlates with trust in President, Parliament and political parties only for urban areas, highlighting the importance of social network in a context in which social capital is typically lower than in rural areas (Carreras and Bowler, 2013).

Table 3 reports the results of the ordered logit regressions estimated on the full sample, including an urban dummy variable. The urban dummy is negative and statistically significant for most political trust variables, i.e. trust in political parties, Parliament, Supreme Court of Justice, and for trust in the police. Conditioning on the effects of the other explanatory variables, the urban-rural divide appears to be irrelevant only in the case of trust in the president. These findings support H4: differences in political trust between urban and rural populations persist beyond observable characteristics. This suggests that the evidence in Table 2 regarding the difference in means of the outcome variables across the urban and rural subsamples is not just due to differences in the covariates' levels, but possibly also to a direct effect of the spatial context. As a matter of fact, this evidence is not uncommon. Kenny and Luca (2021) investigate trust in democracy in Western Europe and find the same. They impute this finding to the role of places on identity, a dimension acquiring more and more importance in the political arena.

As next step, Table 4 illustrates the Oaxaca decomposition estimated as in Eq. (4), with $\hat{\beta}_i^*$ weighted using the method proposed by Cotton (1988). As anticipated, this approach allows us to quantify the share of the difference in political trust attributable to differences in respondents' characteristics between rural and urban areas, and the share that cannot be explained by these difference, which we interpret as reflecting unobserved factors distinguishing the two contexts.

Let us consider the overall decomposition first (first row). For most types of trust, both the unexplained and the explained part are significant - the composition effect is complemented by differences in impacts

⁵ The only partial exception to the findings on income regards trust in the police. As a matter of fact, trust in police is a dimension of political trust showing a slightly smaller similarity in determinants if we compare it to the other dimensions of political trust – see also the more prominent roles of ethnicity and professional condition.

Table 2
Ordered logit regression results by urban and rural area.

	Trust President		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Sex: female	-0.058* (0.031)	-0.261*** (0.057)	0.018 (0.032)	-0.151*** (0.058)	0.100*** (0.031)	0.003 (0.057)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.091 (0.057)	0.070** (0.031)	0.038 (0.057)
n° children	0.025** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.006 (0.019)	0.042*** (0.012)	0.037** (0.019)	0.020 (0.012)	0.016 (0.019)	0.010 (0.012)	0.002 (0.019)
Education	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.040*** (0.004)	-0.045*** (0.007)	-0.042*** (0.004)	-0.048*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.007)
Ethnicity: White	0.038 (0.034)	0.064 (0.064)	0.085** (0.034)	0.089 (0.064)	0.187*** (0.034)	0.028 (0.063)	0.155*** (0.033)	0.083 (0.063)	0.289*** (0.033)	0.162** (0.063)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.010 (0.062)	-0.000 (0.075)	-0.063 (0.064)	-0.021 (0.076)	-0.136** (0.063)	-0.031 (0.076)	0.030 (0.062)	0.199*** (0.075)	-0.111* (0.061)	-0.105 (0.074)
Ethnicity: Black	0.007 (0.053)	0.230*** (0.084)	-0.086 (0.055)	-0.070 (0.085)	-0.211*** (0.053)	-0.377*** (0.084)	0.109** (0.053)	0.039 (0.084)	-0.206*** (0.053)	-0.399*** (0.083)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.273*** (0.058)	0.064 (0.111)	-0.193*** (0.059)	-0.205* (0.111)	0.086 (0.058)	-0.229** (0.111)	0.316*** (0.059)	0.166 (0.110)	0.293*** (0.058)	0.133 (0.111)
Civil status: single	-0.139*** (0.033)	0.003 (0.056)	0.086** (0.034)	0.073 (0.057)	0.030 (0.033)	0.052 (0.057)	0.026 (0.033)	0.020 (0.057)	-0.022 (0.032)	0.050 (0.056)
Income	-0.039*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.028*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.030*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.263*** (0.035)	0.355*** (0.065)	0.132*** (0.036)	0.143** (0.066)	0.126*** (0.035)	0.171*** (0.065)	0.174*** (0.035)	0.146** (0.065)	0.060* (0.035)	-0.078 (0.064)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.500*** (0.034)	-0.414*** (0.057)	-0.255*** (0.035)	-0.221*** (0.057)	-0.286*** (0.034)	-0.204*** (0.056)	-0.336*** (0.034)	-0.284*** (0.056)	-0.220*** (0.034)	-0.192*** (0.056)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.194*** (0.029)	0.019 (0.051)	0.218*** (0.030)	0.154*** (0.051)	0.140*** (0.030)	0.108** (0.051)	0.214*** (0.029)	0.105** (0.051)	0.296*** (0.029)	0.326*** (0.050)
Crime Victimization	-0.210*** (0.032)	-0.231*** (0.064)	-0.279*** (0.033)	-0.119* (0.065)	-0.222*** (0.032)	-0.210*** (0.065)	-0.242*** (0.032)	-0.159** (0.065)	-0.321*** (0.032)	-0.224*** (0.064)
Party position: No	-0.256*** (0.035)	-0.430*** (0.058)	-0.643*** (0.035)	-0.572*** (0.058)	-0.260*** (0.034)	-0.307*** (0.057)	-0.156*** (0.034)	-0.202*** (0.058)	-0.120*** (0.034)	-0.203*** (0.057)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.313*** (0.032)	0.302*** (0.056)	0.534*** (0.032)	0.569*** (0.056)	0.330*** (0.032)	0.267*** (0.055)	0.336*** (0.032)	0.316*** (0.056)	0.064** (0.031)	0.069 (0.055)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.076*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.035*** (0.008)	0.007 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.091*** (0.008)	0.087*** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.008)	0.066*** (0.014)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.095*** (0.032)	-0.158** (0.065)	-0.047 (0.033)	-0.145** (0.066)	-0.070** (0.032)	-0.177*** (0.064)	-0.107*** (0.032)	-0.182*** (0.064)	-0.153*** (0.032)	-0.116* (0.064)
Trust in people: yes	0.143*** (0.030)	0.039 (0.051)	0.244*** (0.031)	-0.002 (0.052)	0.257*** (0.030)	0.037 (0.051)	0.254*** (0.030)	0.149*** (0.051)	0.285*** (0.030)	0.207*** (0.051)
Not working but with a job	0.207*** (0.061)	0.190* (0.113)	-0.095 (0.063)	0.173 (0.113)	-0.109* (0.061)	-0.068 (0.112)	0.059 (0.061)	0.185* (0.109)	-0.031 (0.061)	0.113 (0.109)
Looking for a job	0.059 (0.046)	0.083 (0.081)	0.089* (0.047)	-0.032 (0.082)	0.046 (0.047)	0.062 (0.080)	-0.005 (0.046)	0.132* (0.080)	0.119** (0.046)	0.280*** (0.080)
Student	0.141** (0.055)	0.310*** (0.103)	0.328*** (0.057)	0.454*** (0.104)	0.217*** (0.056)	0.383*** (0.102)	0.258*** (0.055)	0.451*** (0.102)	0.243*** (0.055)	0.486*** (0.101)
Homeworker	0.110** (0.046)	0.129* (0.075)	0.062 (0.048)	0.143* (0.076)	-0.001 (0.047)	0.079 (0.075)	0.003 (0.046)	0.165** (0.075)	0.178*** (0.046)	0.252*** (0.075)
Inactive	0.127 (0.078)	0.036 (0.116)	0.212*** (0.079)	0.052 (0.119)	-0.024 (0.079)	-0.084 (0.119)	0.027 (0.079)	0.025 (0.122)	0.106 (0.079)	0.375*** (0.116)
Num.Obs.	16065	5366	16024	5351	15881	5314	15923	5300	16109	5392
AIC	58766.1	20084.8	51946.9	18386.2	57632.0	19870.2	58898.7	19932.0	60749.8	20640.0

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

on political trust of otherwise equivalent characteristics of respondents in the two subsamples.⁶ For trust in the Parliament, political parties and the Supreme Court of Justice, the unexplained part is always slightly

⁶ In the case of trust in the president, the difference in means between the rural and urban subsamples is only due to the differences in the means of the covariates in the two geographical contexts (composition effect). In fact, only the explained part of the Oaxaca decomposition is significant, which is coherent with the statistical insignificance of the urban dummy in Table 3. This means that only difference in means of the outcome variables across the urban and rural subsamples matter. A possible explanation is that, unlike in advanced democracies where urban-rural divides structure political behaviour, trust in Latin American presidents is largely driven by macroeconomic performance, corruption scandals, security conditions, and partisan or ideological alignment, all of which operate at the national level and affect citizens across space (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Power and Zucco, 2012).

smaller than the explained part: the first accounts for around 45% of the differences in trust, while the second around 55%. For trust in police, instead, the unexplained part is higher than the explained one, accounting for around 70% and 30% respectively. Although not entirely comparable, let us contrast the urban-rural divide of trust in Latin America to the north-south divide of trust in Europe (Arvanitidis et al., 2021). In their results, the unexplained part outweighs the explained part when analysing trust in national institutions. This is generally not the case here, but the unexplained part remains relevant, in spite of the use of a comprehensive set of covariates.

The features that predict the different levels of trust may affect the size of the composition effect, the size of the structure effect or both. The bottom part of Table 3 illustrates these contributions. Interestingly, education, income, increased and decreased income are variables contributing only to the explained component (this is true also for the variable of interest in politics). Interpreting the evidence on the

Table 3
Ordered logit regression results.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.102*** (0.027)	-0.018 (0.028)	0.079*** (0.027)	-0.035 (0.027)	0.067** (0.027)
n° children	0.019* (0.010)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.019* (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)
Education	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.030*** (0.004)	-0.041*** (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.003)
Ethnicity: White	0.044 (0.030)	0.089*** (0.030)	0.154*** (0.030)	0.144*** (0.030)	0.264*** (0.029)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.006 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.049)	-0.068 (0.048)	0.120** (0.048)	-0.094** (0.047)
Ethnicity: Black	0.066 (0.045)	-0.087* (0.046)	-0.265*** (0.045)	0.082* (0.045)	-0.268*** (0.045)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.227*** (0.051)	-0.203*** (0.052)	0.011 (0.051)	0.278*** (0.052)	0.254*** (0.051)
Civil status: single	-0.100*** (0.028)	0.084*** (0.029)	0.035 (0.029)	0.027 (0.028)	-0.000 (0.028)
Income	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.032*** (0.002)	-0.031*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.286*** (0.031)	0.139*** (0.032)	0.139*** (0.031)	0.170*** (0.031)	0.028 (0.031)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.478*** (0.029)	-0.245*** (0.030)	-0.262*** (0.029)	-0.321*** (0.029)	-0.212*** (0.029)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.151*** (0.025)	0.203*** (0.026)	0.132*** (0.025)	0.188*** (0.025)	0.304*** (0.025)
Crime Victimization	-0.217*** (0.029)	-0.252*** (0.029)	-0.221*** (0.029)	-0.229*** (0.029)	-0.303*** (0.028)
Party position: No	-0.300*** (0.030)	-0.624*** (0.030)	-0.274*** (0.030)	-0.170*** (0.030)	-0.142*** (0.029)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.310*** (0.028)	0.541*** (0.028)	0.314*** (0.028)	0.331*** (0.027)	0.064** (0.027)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.067*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.056*** (0.007)	0.090*** (0.007)	0.066*** (0.007)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.109*** (0.029)	-0.069** (0.029)	-0.091*** (0.029)	-0.123*** (0.028)	-0.147*** (0.028)
Trust in people: yes	0.117*** (0.026)	0.180*** (0.026)	0.201*** (0.026)	0.229*** (0.026)	0.264*** (0.026)
Not working but with a job	0.200*** (0.054)	-0.039 (0.055)	-0.101* (0.054)	0.088 (0.053)	0.001 (0.053)
Looking for a job	0.062 (0.040)	0.057 (0.041)	0.044 (0.040)	0.025 (0.040)	0.154*** (0.040)
Student	0.172*** (0.049)	0.352*** (0.050)	0.253*** (0.049)	0.298*** (0.049)	0.293*** (0.048)
Homeworker	0.096** (0.039)	0.076* (0.040)	0.016 (0.039)	0.043 (0.039)	0.190*** (0.039)
Inactive	0.090 (0.065)	0.158** (0.066)	-0.044 (0.066)	0.021 (0.066)	0.188*** (0.065)
Urban	-0.010 (0.029)	-0.124*** (0.030)	-0.111*** (0.029)	-0.115*** (0.029)	-0.208*** (0.029)
Num.Obs.	21431	21375	21195	21223	21501
AIC	78879.7	70336.4	77500.2	78814.4	81406.3

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

explained component is important, as it allows to draw policy-relevant implications to address the gap in political trust between rural and urban areas. We will then focus on the analysis of the variables affecting the size of the explained part that can be used as policy targets. In terms of relative size of the contribution, income and education play a major role in the explained component. Both have a positive sign, meaning that income and schooling differences between urban and rural areas drive an increase in the gap in political trust. Although higher income (and education) is associated to lower levels of trust for both rural and urban residents (negative coefficients in Table 2), the reduction in trust is larger for the latter, resulting in an increasing gap between them. Paradoxically, narrowing the gap in income and education for people living in rural areas would end up making them more similar to urban residents. Mathematically, this suggests a pathway toward a “downward convergence”, where the regional gap narrows because rural trust levels

decline toward the urban levels.

On the other hand, crime victimization, the third factor in terms of relative contribution to the composition effect, also displays a positive sign. Coherently with our third hypothesis, this entails that the increasing crime disparities between urban and rural areas may be associated with a widening gap in political trust. Given that victimization is higher in cities and is associated with diminished trust across both settings (Table 1), a reduction in urban crime levels could be linked to a rise in political confidence within these areas. This dynamic represents a potential “upward convergence”, where the trust gap is narrowed by elevating urban trust levels rather than eroding the rural advantage. A similar logic applies to neighbourhood safety, where anti-crime initiatives may be associated with more balanced regional trust levels and a general rise in political trust.

Summing up, the Oaxaca decomposition points to two distinct

Table 4
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of rural-urban difference in trust.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Overall	0.129*** (0.017)	0.001 (0.034)	0.134*** (0.015)	0.103*** (0.029)	0.152*** (0.015)	0.111*** (0.030)	0.163*** (0.015)	0.112*** (0.030)	0.096*** (0.016)	0.211*** (0.032)
Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	0.556** (0.246)	0.000 (0.000)	0.464** (0.189)	0.000 (0.000)	0.481** (0.202)	0.000 (0.000)	0.473** (0.209)	0.000 (0.000)	0.437** (0.219)
Age	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.171* (0.103)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.148* (0.084)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.097 (0.089)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.225** (0.089)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.213** (0.092)
Sex: female	0.002 (0.002)	-0.108*** (0.035)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.060* (0.031)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.042 (0.033)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.017 (0.032)
n° children	0.005 (0.003)	-0.041 (0.028)	0.006** (0.003)	-0.032 (0.023)	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.025)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.026)
Education	0.040*** (0.011)	0.009 (0.099)	0.065*** (0.010)	0.058 (0.077)	0.083*** (0.011)	-0.060 (0.083)	0.083*** (0.010)	-0.066 (0.083)	0.066*** (0.011)	-0.089 (0.085)
Ethnicity: White	-0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.022)	-0.006** (0.003)	0.003 (0.018)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.038** (0.019)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.035* (0.020)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.011 (0.008)	0.007 (0.004)	0.018** (0.007)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.000 (0.008)
Ethnicity: Black	0.002 (0.002)	0.023** (0.011)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.019** (0.009)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.024** (0.011)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.016 (0.010)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.011 (0.009)
Civil status: single	0.003** (0.001)	0.116** (0.050)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.005 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.011 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.044)	0.000 (0.001)	0.053 (0.048)
Income	0.091*** (0.009)	0.086 (0.053)	0.049*** (0.007)	-0.043 (0.044)	0.071*** (0.008)	0.005 (0.048)	0.068*** (0.008)	0.061 (0.047)	0.002 (0.008)	0.128*** (0.049)
Trend hous. income: Improved	-0.014*** (0.003)	0.024 (0.020)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.008 (0.016)	-0.006** (0.003)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.032* (0.018)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.018*** (0.004)	0.034 (0.022)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.005 (0.018)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.021)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.112*** (0.033)	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.027 (0.028)	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.013 (0.030)	0.012*** (0.003)	-0.059** (0.030)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.018 (0.031)
Crime Victimization	0.024*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.020)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.031* (0.016)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.018)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.016 (0.018)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.017 (0.020)
Party position: No	0.008** (0.003)	-0.139** (0.057)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.047 (0.050)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.034 (0.051)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.028 (0.052)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.075 (0.050)
Interest in politics: Yes	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.022*** (0.004)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.020 (0.022)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.022)
Policy against Inequality: Important	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.187* (0.099)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.099 (0.078)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.016 (0.087)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.020 (0.089)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.096)
Religion importance: Not important	0.015** (0.006)	-0.015 (0.020)	0.008* (0.005)	-0.018 (0.016)	0.011** (0.005)	-0.022 (0.017)	0.014*** (0.005)	-0.015 (0.017)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.018)
Trust in people: yes	0.002** (0.001)	-0.061* (0.037)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.107*** (0.031)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.113*** (0.032)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.053 (0.033)	0.005*** (0.002)	-0.037 (0.034)
Not working but with a job	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)	0.012* (0.007)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.009 (0.007)
Looking for a job	0.000 (0.001)	0.004 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004 (0.011)	0.000 (0.001)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000 (0.001)	0.023* (0.013)
Student	-0.002 (0.002)	0.017* (0.010)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.015* (0.008)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.014* (0.008)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.021** (0.009)
Homeworker	0.011** (0.005)	0.003 (0.017)	0.006 (0.004)	0.011 (0.014)	0.003 (0.005)	0.016 (0.015)	0.004 (0.004)	0.029* (0.015)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.016 (0.016)
Inactive	0.002 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.002)	0.012** (0.006)
Obs.	21431	21431	21375	21375	21195	21195	21223	21223	21501	21501

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

dynamics underlying the rural-urban divide in political trust: city “penalties” and rural “delays”. In urban areas, high crime and feeling unsafe act as a penalty that drags trust down. In rural areas, lower levels of education and income operate more as a delay, in the sense that individuals living there are less likely to develop higher expectations and more critical attitudes toward government that usually come with modern city life. This gives rise to a non-trivial policy trade-off. If we close the gap by making cities safer, trust goes up for everyone—an “upward convergence”. But if we close the gap by increasing education and income in the countryside, rural trust might actually drop to match the low levels in the city—a “downward convergence”. This happens because, as documented in the Latin American context, when people get wealthier and more educated they “raise the bar” and expect much more from their leaders (Segovia et al., 2021). If these expectations are not

met, their trust falls.

Finally, we conducted a series of robustness checks, reported in the Appendix. First, we estimated probit models including country fixed effects (Tables A2, A3). Second, we re-estimated the models using linear probability models (LPMs), both with and without country fixed effects (Tables A4–A7). Third, we performed an Oaxaca decomposition using the Neumark (1988) weighting scheme (Table A8). All results are fully consistent with our main findings.

In addition, all models were re-estimated including a variable capturing whether the respondent voted for the elected candidate (Tables A9–A18). Although the sample size is reduced by roughly half, the results remain unchanged. The coefficient of the variable is consistently positive and statistically significant in the separate estimations. However, neither its coefficient nor its mean values differ between

urban and rural areas. This lack of differential effects explains its non-significance in the Oaxaca decomposition.

6. Conclusions

In our paper we show that, on average, political trust, encompassing trust in the president, in Parliament, in parties, in the Supreme Court of Justice, and in the police, is higher in rural than in urban areas across Latin America. This aligns with existing studies on developing countries (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Carreras and Bowler, 2013; Bland et al., 2023), where rural areas often report higher levels of political trust despite the less favourable conditions. On the other hand, our findings contrast with Western and developed countries patterns, thereby reinforcing the idea that political trust is deeply shaped by the spatial socio-economic context.

Indeed, residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in large cities experience a “city penalty,” whereby high expectations of public institutions and services collide with disappointing realities. Education and income emerge as key determinants, both displaying a negative association with political trust. This evidence suggests that low political trust reflects unmet expectations among relatively advantaged individuals rather than absolute deprivation, consistent with a mechanism of status anxiety. Furthermore, recent deterioration in individual economic conditions is associated with lower levels of political trust, while income growth is linked to higher trust and confidence. These findings align with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and support the hypothesis that economic dynamics shape expectations toward democracy and political institutions.

As far as we know, scholars have not yet identified the role of composition and idiosyncratic factors that characterise the differences in political trust between urban and rural areas. To fill this gap, we relied on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method. Our evidence shows that roughly half of the urban-rural divide in trust is due to idiosyncratic effects, suggesting that current theories on political trust may still be missing relevant variables. This means that the levels of trust between these areas would not be the same even if the average individual characteristics of people living in urban and rural contexts were identical. However, for the part we can explain, the divide is driven primarily by differences in education, income, and crime. As we noted in our results, if rural areas shared the urban socio-economic profile, the trust gap would be much smaller—but largely because rural trust would likely fall. This is especially true for trust in the president, where observed characteristics explain the entire gap.

These findings present a clear policy paradox: closing the trust gap is not the same as increasing trust. As we have shown, the most likely path for Latin America is a “downward convergence”, whereby the regional gap narrows because trust levels in rural areas decline toward the urban baseline as income and educational attainment among rural residents converge toward those of urban populations.

This may happen because if rural residents become wealthier and more educated, they “raise the bar” for government performance (Segovia et al., 2021). In turn, if their expectations are not met, their trust tends to drop toward the lower urban baseline. While the regional inequality in trust decreases, the country as a whole becomes more skeptical. We argue that this downward trend poses a significant risk to

democratic resilience. To move toward a more desirable “upward convergence”, policy must move beyond general development and specifically target the “urban penalties”, like crime and insecurity, that currently decrease trust.

As a consequence, even if a “buffer” of trust for rural residents would be there anyway (the unexplained part), it is essential to provide effective solutions for citizens to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of political institutions. This is of paramount importance given the profound crisis of trust unfolding globally, and particularly in Latin America (Keefer and Scartascini, 2022). Lack of trust means limits to the capacity to act of governments that, instead of being recognized as able to solve societal problems, are recognized as part of the problems. When governments are seen as part of the problem rather than the solution, mistrust hinders growth, innovation and distorts democratic decision-making. It may also lead to a deterioration in the provision of public goods and more in general to a resource misallocation, further eroding general and political trust. To prevent this from happening, governments should act responsibly, and politicians in general must ensure that both urban citizens (who have already “raised the bar”) and rural citizens (who may do so in the future) have tangible reasons to remain confident in their institutions. Specifically, institutions should move away from distant or purely reactive security strategies toward models that prioritize the direct protection and inclusion of urban communities. By transforming the State’s role from a distant authority into a visible protector, governments can directly counter the “urban penalty” caused by crime. Furthermore, to satisfy the demands of a more educated and critical citizenry, institutions should adopt open-government and transparency protocols. By making public spending and institutional decisions easier for the average citizen to track, governments can justify the “raised bar” of expectations with clear evidence of accountability. Finally, to prevent trust from declining as rural areas modernize, governments must prepare to replace traditional loyalty with performance-based credibility. This can be achieved by empowering local administrations to improve the visible quality of daily public services—such as infrastructure, health, and transports. This would also be useful in light of the results for urban areas. When citizens see the State effectively managing their immediate environment, it provides a tangible reason for confidence that can withstand the “raised bar” of a more educated and demanding population.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Chiara Dalle Nogare: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Investigation, Conceptualization. **Chiara Ferrante:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Investigation, Conceptualization. **Nicola Pontarollo:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. **Joselin Segovia:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Investigation, Conceptualization.

Declaration of interests

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Appendix

Table A1
Descriptive statistics.

Statistic	Oversll				Rural				Urban			
	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	40.2962	16.7236	16	99	39.2793	16.1561	16	99	40.6552	16.9052	16	95
Trust in Parliament	3.3514	1.8390	1	7	3.5643	1.8775	1	7	3.2767	1.8195	1	7
Trust in police	3.7948	1.9281	1	7	4.0460	1.9528	1	7	3.7064	1.9116	1	7
Trust in pol. parties	2.6778	1.7014	1	7	2.8612	1.7661	1	7	2.6134	1.6734	1	7
Trust in president	3.5728	2.1279	1	7	3.6858	2.1268	1	7	3.5332	2.1270	1	7
Trust in Supreme Court of Justice	3.5845	1.8241	1	7	3.8042	1.8309	1	7	3.5079	1.8155	1	7
Education	10.0066	4.2647	0	18	8.5207	4.3201	0	18	10.5221	4.1221	0	18
Vote for elected candidate	0.5789	0.4938	0	1	0.5952	0.4909	0	1	0.5735	0.4946	0	1
Policy against inequality important	5.3016	1.7921	1	7	5.2314	1.8421	1	7	5.3262	1.7737	1	7
n° children	1.0486	1.2452	0	15	1.1812	1.3036	0	14	1.0017	1.2206	0	15
Trust in people: yes	0.5553	0.4969	0	1	0.5639	0.4959	0	1	0.5522	0.4973	0	1
Sex: female	0.5029	0.5000	0	1	0.5004	0.5000	0	1	0.5038	0.5000	0	1
Crime victimization: Yes	0.2453	0.4303	0	1	0.1678	0.3737	0	1	0.2727	0.4453	0	1
Party position: Yes	0.7436	0.4367	0	1	0.7278	0.4451	0	1	0.7491	0.4335	0	1
Income	9.4397	6.1602	1	34	7.6909	6.0449	1	34	10.0528	6.0824	1	34
Civil status: single	1.6917	0.4618	1	2	1.6725	0.4693	1	2	1.6985	0.4589	1	2
Religion importance: Not important	1.2438	0.4294	1	2	1.1648	0.3710	1	2	1.2717	0.4449	1	2
Neighborhood perceived safety: Safe	1.5068	0.5000	1	2	1.5520	0.4973	1	2	1.4908	0.4999	1	2
Interest in politics	1.3268	0.4691	1	2	1.2954	0.4562	1	2	1.3380	0.4730	1	2
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.0764	0.2657	0	1	0.1338	0.3405	0	1	0.0566	0.2310	0	1
Ethnicity: Black	0.1073	0.3095	0	1	0.1330	0.3396	0	1	0.0984	0.2978	0	1
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.0649	0.2463	0	1	0.0539	0.2259	0	1	0.0687	0.2529	0	1
Ethnicity: White	0.2661	0.4419	0	1	0.2167	0.4120	0	1	0.2832	0.4505	0	1
Household income in last 2 years: Not changed	0.4724	0.4992	0	1	0.4815	0.4997	0	1	0.4692	0.4991	0	1
Household income in last 2 years: Improved	0.2239	0.4169	0	1	0.1923	0.3941	0	1	0.2350	0.4240	0	1
Household income in last 2 years: Worsened	0.3037	0.4599	0	1	0.3262	0.4689	0	1	0.2958	0.4564	0	1
Working	0.4469	0.4972	0	1	0.4157	0.4929	0	1	0.4578	0.4982	0	1
Not working, but with a job	0.0525	0.2231	0	1	0.0475	0.2128	0	1	0.0543	0.2266	0	1
Looking for a job	0.1201	0.3250	0	1	0.1211	0.3262	0	1	0.1197	0.3246	0	1
Student	0.0778	0.2679	0	1	0.0653	0.2472	0	1	0.0822	0.2747	0	1
Homeworker	0.1830	0.3867	0	1	0.2513	0.4338	0	1	0.1589	0.3656	0	1
Retired	0.0764	0.2657	0	1	0.0468	0.2113	0	1	0.0869	0.2817	0	1
Inactive	0.0427	0.2022	0	1	0.0516	0.2212	0	1	0.0396	0.1949	0	1

Table A2
Ordered - logit regression results with country dummies.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.094*** (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)	0.073*** (0.027)	-0.050* (0.027)	0.031 (0.027)
n° children	0.035*** (0.011)	0.027** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.010)
Education	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.004)	-0.045*** (0.004)	-0.045*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.004)
Ethnicity: White	0.124*** (0.033)	0.113*** (0.033)	0.151*** (0.032)	0.099*** (0.032)	0.087*** (0.032)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.024 (0.050)	-0.036 (0.051)	0.001 (0.051)	0.096* (0.050)	-0.090* (0.049)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.199*** (0.058)	-0.024 (0.059)	-0.055 (0.058)	-0.131** (0.057)	-0.135** (0.057)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.113* (0.059)	-0.046 (0.059)	0.061 (0.058)	-0.015 (0.058)	-0.073 (0.058)
Civil status: single	-0.010 (0.029)	0.097*** (0.030)	0.027 (0.029)	0.076*** (0.029)	-0.005 (0.029)
Income	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.244*** (0.032)	0.140*** (0.032)	0.138*** (0.032)	0.157*** (0.031)	0.072** (0.031)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.393*** (0.030)	-0.238*** (0.030)	-0.270*** (0.029)	-0.286*** (0.029)	-0.242*** (0.029)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.204*** (0.026)	0.225*** (0.026)	0.176*** (0.026)	0.194*** (0.026)	0.303*** (0.025)

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Table A2 (continued)

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Crime Victimization	-0.250*** (0.029)	-0.272*** (0.030)	-0.244*** (0.029)	-0.238*** (0.029)	-0.305*** (0.029)
Party position: No	-0.352*** (0.031)	-0.623*** (0.031)	-0.254*** (0.030)	-0.174*** (0.030)	-0.129*** (0.030)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.321*** (0.028)	0.513*** (0.028)	0.273*** (0.028)	0.301*** (0.028)	0.109*** (0.027)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.080*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.062*** (0.007)	0.081*** (0.007)	0.054*** (0.007)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.149*** (0.030)	-0.139*** (0.030)	-0.189*** (0.030)	-0.181*** (0.030)	-0.231*** (0.029)
Trust in people: yes	0.168*** (0.026)	0.165*** (0.027)	0.180*** (0.026)	0.220*** (0.026)	0.279*** (0.026)
Not working but with a job	0.098* (0.055)	0.031 (0.056)	-0.025 (0.055)	0.055 (0.054)	-0.088 (0.054)
Looking for a job	0.129*** (0.041)	0.100** (0.042)	0.151*** (0.041)	0.092** (0.040)	0.076* (0.041)
Student	0.172*** (0.049)	0.354*** (0.050)	0.283*** (0.049)	0.323*** (0.049)	0.187*** (0.049)
Homeworker	0.105*** (0.040)	0.089** (0.041)	0.077* (0.040)	0.092** (0.040)	0.180*** (0.039)
Inactive	0.148** (0.066)	0.228*** (0.067)	0.068 (0.066)	0.092 (0.067)	0.163** (0.066)
Urban	-0.199*** (0.031)	-0.166*** (0.031)	-0.238*** (0.031)	-0.225*** (0.031)	-0.228*** (0.030)
Num.Obs.	21431	21375	21195	21223	21501
AIC	76959.0	70046.5	76270.2	77988.6	80214.2

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3

Ordered - logit results by urban and rural area with country dummies by area.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Age	0.014*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Sex: female	-0.037 (0.032)	-0.281*** (0.058)	0.025 (0.032)	-0.157*** (0.059)	0.099*** (0.031)	-0.006 (0.058)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.113** (0.057)	0.070** (0.031)	0.038 (0.057)
n° children	0.041*** (0.013)	0.015 (0.020)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.011 (0.020)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.030 (0.019)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.029 (0.020)	0.010 (0.012)	0.002 (0.019)
Education	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.042*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.004)	-0.037*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.052*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.053*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.007)
Ethnicity: White	0.121*** (0.037)	0.115* (0.070)	0.108*** (0.038)	0.132* (0.070)	0.152*** (0.037)	0.117* (0.069)	0.096*** (0.037)	0.080 (0.069)	0.289*** (0.033)	0.162** (0.063)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.012 (0.064)	-0.032 (0.082)	-0.053 (0.066)	-0.078 (0.083)	-0.058 (0.065)	0.027 (0.084)	0.015 (0.064)	0.173** (0.083)	-0.111* (0.061)	-0.105 (0.074)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.227*** (0.067)	-0.080 (0.116)	-0.024 (0.068)	-0.045 (0.119)	-0.045 (0.067)	-0.114 (0.116)	-0.122* (0.066)	-0.171 (0.116)	-0.206*** (0.053)	-0.399*** (0.083)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.094 (0.067)	-0.156 (0.123)	-0.025 (0.067)	-0.090 (0.122)	0.105 (0.066)	-0.082 (0.122)	-0.010 (0.067)	-0.027 (0.120)	0.293*** (0.058)	0.133 (0.111)
Civil status: single	-0.026 (0.034)	0.018 (0.058)	0.092*** (0.035)	0.110* (0.059)	0.029 (0.034)	0.039 (0.059)	0.080** (0.034)	0.059 (0.058)	-0.022 (0.032)	0.050 (0.056)
Income	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.227*** (0.036)	0.273*** (0.066)	0.135*** (0.037)	0.145** (0.067)	0.123*** (0.036)	0.166** (0.066)	0.157*** (0.036)	0.136** (0.066)	0.060* (0.035)	-0.078 (0.064)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.411*** (0.035)	-0.342*** (0.057)	-0.251*** (0.035)	-0.210*** (0.057)	-0.296*** (0.034)	-0.212*** (0.057)	-0.289*** (0.034)	-0.276*** (0.057)	-0.220*** (0.034)	-0.192*** (0.056)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.242*** (0.030)	0.097* (0.051)	0.244*** (0.030)	0.167*** (0.052)	0.186*** (0.030)	0.150*** (0.051)	0.213*** (0.030)	0.120** (0.051)	0.296*** (0.029)	0.326*** (0.050)
Crime Victimization	-0.234*** (0.033)	-0.281*** (0.065)	-0.297*** (0.033)	-0.145** (0.066)	-0.242*** (0.032)	-0.234*** (0.065)	-0.248*** (0.032)	-0.168*** (0.065)	-0.321*** (0.032)	-0.224*** (0.064)
Party position: No	-0.333*** (0.036)	-0.408*** (0.059)	-0.643*** (0.036)	-0.573*** (0.059)	-0.230*** (0.035)	-0.315*** (0.059)	-0.155*** (0.035)	-0.218*** (0.059)	-0.120*** (0.034)	-0.203*** (0.057)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.312*** (0.032)	0.339*** (0.057)	0.498*** (0.033)	0.573*** (0.057)	0.280*** (0.032)	0.241*** (0.056)	0.300*** (0.032)	0.288*** (0.056)	0.064** (0.031)	0.069 (0.055)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.087*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.013 (0.015)	0.063*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.082*** (0.008)	0.076*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.008)	0.066*** (0.014)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.137*** (0.033)	-0.216*** (0.067)	-0.114*** (0.034)	-0.210*** (0.068)	-0.183*** (0.034)	-0.222*** (0.067)	-0.178*** (0.033)	-0.196*** (0.066)	-0.153*** (0.032)	-0.116* (0.064)
Trust in people: yes	0.201***	0.066	0.224***	0.004	0.224***	0.056	0.249***	0.139***	0.285***	0.207***

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Table A3 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.051)
Not working but with a job	0.116*	0.080	-0.009	0.199*	-0.028	0.010	0.040	0.139	-0.031	0.113
	(0.062)	(0.115)	(0.064)	(0.115)	(0.062)	(0.114)	(0.062)	(0.111)	(0.061)	(0.109)
Looking for a job	0.141***	0.122	0.131***	0.008	0.154***	0.164**	0.066	0.188**	0.119**	0.280***
	(0.048)	(0.082)	(0.048)	(0.083)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.046)	(0.080)
Student	0.152***	0.302***	0.337***	0.453***	0.266***	0.406***	0.290***	0.454***	0.243***	0.486***
	(0.056)	(0.105)	(0.057)	(0.105)	(0.056)	(0.103)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.055)	(0.101)
Homeworker	0.115**	0.143*	0.063	0.158**	0.054	0.144*	0.045	0.218***	0.178***	0.252***
	(0.047)	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.077)	(0.047)	(0.076)	(0.047)	(0.077)	(0.046)	(0.075)
Inactive	0.190**	0.073	0.286***	0.106	0.108	0.003	0.114	0.062	0.106	0.375***
	(0.080)	(0.117)	(0.080)	(0.120)	(0.080)	(0.120)	(0.080)	(0.123)	(0.079)	(0.116)
Num.Obs.	16065	5366	16024	5351	15881	5314	15923	5300	16109	5392
AIC	57147.6	19757.5	51697.7	18354.0	56574.1	19697.2	58139.6	19851.3	60749.8	20640.0

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4

OLS regression results.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Intercept	3.345***	3.176***	3.724***	3.647***	3.445***
	(0.104)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.094)
Age	0.014***	0.001	0.001	0.002*	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex: female	-0.116***	-0.008	0.072***	-0.038	0.065**
	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
n° children	0.024**	0.030***	0.040***	0.020*	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.021***	-0.035***	-0.044***	-0.043***	-0.034***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Ethnicity: White	0.059*	0.095***	0.161***	0.152***	0.278***
	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.005	-0.023	-0.052	0.133***	-0.105**
	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Ethnicity: Black	0.099*	0.002	-0.219***	0.103**	-0.253***
	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.272***	-0.148***	0.028	0.296***	0.264***
	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Civil status: single	-0.113***	0.086***	0.033	0.027	0.000
	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Income	-0.040***	-0.021***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.328***	0.128***	0.147***	0.176***	0.036
	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.522***	-0.201***	-0.247***	-0.305***	-0.221***
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.173***	0.165***	0.126***	0.185***	0.319***
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Crime Victimization	-0.244***	-0.221***	-0.214***	-0.222***	-0.318***
	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Party position: No	-0.346***	-0.588***	-0.278***	-0.165***	-0.149***
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.354***	0.499***	0.317***	0.330***	0.070**
	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.074***	0.027***	0.055***	0.083***	0.066***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.138***	-0.075***	-0.097***	-0.135***	-0.157***
	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Trust in people: yes	0.125***	0.143***	0.188***	0.218***	0.269***
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Not working but with a job	0.224***	-0.031	-0.104**	0.088*	-0.002
	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Looking for a job	0.080*	0.058	0.058	0.032	0.167***
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Student	0.176***	0.308***	0.260***	0.312***	0.310***
	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Homeworker	0.122***	0.075**	0.031	0.047	0.202***
	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Inactive	0.110	0.168***	-0.017	0.024	0.196***
	(0.074)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.071)

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Table A4 (continued)

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Urban	-0.004 (0.033)	-0.103*** (0.027)	-0.111*** (0.030)	-0.110*** (0.029)	-0.212*** (0.031)
Num.Obs.	21431	21375	21195	21223	21501
R2	0.079	0.093	0.063	0.070	0.061
R2 Adj.	0.078	0.092	0.062	0.069	0.059
AIC	90955.0	80686.2	84007.0	83705.1	87473.9

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5

OLS regression results by urban and rural area.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust Police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Intercept	3.217*** (0.122)	3.773*** (0.201)	2.994*** (0.095)	3.458*** (0.169)	3.524*** (0.104)	4.005*** (0.178)	3.465*** (0.104)	3.938*** (0.178)	3.204*** (0.110)	3.641*** (0.187)
Age	0.015*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
Sex: female	-0.065* (0.035)	-0.290*** (0.065)	0.018 (0.027)	-0.107** (0.054)	0.090*** (0.030)	0.001 (0.058)	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.088 (0.056)	0.069** (0.032)	0.033 (0.061)
n° children	0.033** (0.014)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.037*** (0.011)	0.010 (0.018)	0.042*** (0.012)	0.038** (0.019)	0.020 (0.012)	0.019 (0.020)	0.012 (0.013)	0.002 (0.020)
Education	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.004)	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.049*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.050*** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.042*** (0.007)
Ethnicity: White	0.054 (0.038)	0.076 (0.073)	0.090*** (0.030)	0.102* (0.060)	0.193*** (0.033)	0.029 (0.064)	0.165*** (0.033)	0.085 (0.063)	0.308*** (0.035)	0.160** (0.068)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.023 (0.071)	-0.010 (0.084)	-0.040 (0.054)	-0.023 (0.069)	-0.115* (0.062)	-0.023 (0.079)	0.047 (0.062)	0.204*** (0.074)	-0.123* (0.063)	-0.126 (0.078)
Ethnicity: Black	0.039 (0.061)	0.262*** (0.097)	0.012 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.082)	-0.161*** (0.053)	-0.347*** (0.087)	0.135** (0.054)	0.043 (0.087)	-0.183*** (0.057)	-0.416*** (0.091)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.332*** (0.068)	0.071 (0.130)	-0.139*** (0.049)	-0.154 (0.104)	0.107* (0.058)	-0.230** (0.116)	0.344*** (0.060)	0.143 (0.111)	0.307*** (0.063)	0.124 (0.124)
Civil status: single	-0.159*** (0.038)	0.011 (0.064)	0.086*** (0.029)	0.079 (0.053)	0.030 (0.033)	0.046 (0.058)	0.024 (0.033)	0.028 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.034)	0.055 (0.060)
Income	-0.042*** (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.002)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.002)	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.005* (0.003)	0.011** (0.004)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.299*** (0.041)	0.410*** (0.073)	0.117*** (0.032)	0.153** (0.063)	0.129*** (0.035)	0.194*** (0.066)	0.178*** (0.035)	0.161** (0.064)	0.070* (0.036)	-0.080 (0.069)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.549*** (0.038)	-0.440*** (0.064)	-0.206*** (0.030)	-0.189*** (0.052)	-0.270*** (0.033)	-0.190*** (0.057)	-0.318*** (0.033)	-0.272*** (0.056)	-0.225*** (0.035)	-0.213*** (0.060)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.226*** (0.034)	0.017 (0.058)	0.176*** (0.026)	0.126*** (0.048)	0.132*** (0.029)	0.107** (0.051)	0.211*** (0.029)	0.101** (0.050)	0.310*** (0.031)	0.344*** (0.054)
Crime Victimization	-0.235*** (0.036)	-0.265*** (0.071)	-0.247*** (0.028)	-0.095 (0.059)	-0.212*** (0.032)	-0.210*** (0.065)	-0.233*** (0.031)	-0.154** (0.064)	-0.331*** (0.033)	-0.248*** (0.068)
Party position: No	-0.295*** (0.041)	-0.486*** (0.067)	-0.603*** (0.033)	-0.538*** (0.057)	-0.264*** (0.035)	-0.311*** (0.059)	-0.153*** (0.035)	-0.192*** (0.058)	-0.121*** (0.036)	-0.225*** (0.062)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.362*** (0.036)	0.336*** (0.064)	0.492*** (0.029)	0.526*** (0.054)	0.331*** (0.031)	0.270*** (0.056)	0.333*** (0.031)	0.326*** (0.055)	0.070** (0.032)	0.083 (0.058)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.083*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.017)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.013 (0.014)	0.054*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.084*** (0.008)	0.080*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.009)	0.065*** (0.016)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.121*** (0.036)	-0.200*** (0.072)	-0.055** (0.028)	-0.147** (0.058)	-0.076** (0.031)	-0.188*** (0.063)	-0.119*** (0.031)	-0.196*** (0.061)	-0.166*** (0.033)	-0.115* (0.067)
Trust in people: yes	0.151*** (0.034)	0.045 (0.058)	0.190*** (0.026)	0.003 (0.048)	0.239*** (0.030)	0.040 (0.052)	0.241*** (0.029)	0.149*** (0.051)	0.286*** (0.031)	0.222*** (0.055)
Not working but with a job	0.234*** (0.070)	0.197 (0.128)	-0.078 (0.052)	0.138 (0.103)	-0.109* (0.059)	-0.080 (0.111)	0.057 (0.061)	0.195* (0.102)	-0.038 (0.063)	0.125 (0.114)
Looking for a job	0.075 (0.052)	0.107 (0.092)	0.084** (0.041)	-0.015 (0.075)	0.053 (0.046)	0.088 (0.081)	-0.003 (0.045)	0.151* (0.079)	0.124*** (0.049)	0.310*** (0.087)
Student	0.133** (0.060)	0.364*** (0.113)	0.278*** (0.049)	0.423*** (0.095)	0.217*** (0.053)	0.419*** (0.097)	0.273*** (0.052)	0.469*** (0.094)	0.251*** (0.056)	0.551*** (0.102)
Homeworker	0.138*** (0.054)	0.151* (0.086)	0.068 (0.042)	0.121* (0.072)	0.014 (0.046)	0.092 (0.077)	0.013 (0.046)	0.154** (0.076)	0.191*** (0.049)	0.270*** (0.081)
Inactive	0.155* (0.090)	0.033 (0.131)	0.211*** (0.075)	0.082 (0.114)	0.006 (0.080)	-0.067 (0.124)	0.037 (0.082)	0.014 (0.126)	0.121 (0.086)	0.386*** (0.125)
Num.Obs.	16065	5366	16024	5351	15881	5314	15923	5300	16109	5392
R2	0.084	0.072	0.097	0.077	0.063	0.056	0.071	0.058	0.061	0.051
R2 Adj.	0.083	0.068	0.096	0.073	0.062	0.052	0.070	0.054	0.059	0.047
AIC	68191.9	22741.2	60026.0	20636.6	62696.3	21310.3	62716.3	20994.2	65338.1	22128.9

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A6
OLS regression results with country dummies.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Intercept	2.508*** (0.119)	3.264*** (0.098)	4.005*** (0.105)	3.454*** (0.106)	3.835*** (0.111)
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.098*** (0.030)	-0.009 (0.024)	0.065** (0.026)	-0.052** (0.026)	0.026 (0.028)
n° children	0.039*** (0.012)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.011)
Education	-0.036*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.003)	-0.046*** (0.004)	-0.044*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.004)
Ethnicity: White	0.137*** (0.035)	0.116*** (0.029)	0.148*** (0.032)	0.099*** (0.031)	0.090*** (0.033)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.016 (0.053)	-0.010 (0.044)	0.010 (0.048)	0.105** (0.048)	-0.093* (0.050)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.179*** (0.064)	0.038 (0.054)	-0.018 (0.057)	-0.104* (0.057)	-0.135** (0.061)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.093 (0.065)	-0.028 (0.050)	0.057 (0.057)	0.003 (0.058)	-0.080 (0.061)
Civil status: single	-0.016 (0.032)	0.090*** (0.026)	0.019 (0.028)	0.070** (0.028)	-0.013 (0.029)
Income	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.275*** (0.035)	0.130*** (0.029)	0.138*** (0.030)	0.161*** (0.030)	0.081** (0.031)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.402*** (0.032)	-0.196*** (0.026)	-0.249*** (0.028)	-0.261*** (0.028)	-0.245*** (0.030)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.217*** (0.028)	0.180*** (0.023)	0.159*** (0.025)	0.186*** (0.025)	0.301*** (0.026)
Crime Victimization	-0.265*** (0.031)	-0.234*** (0.025)	-0.229*** (0.027)	-0.224*** (0.028)	-0.314*** (0.029)
Party position: No	-0.379*** (0.034)	-0.580*** (0.029)	-0.251*** (0.030)	-0.167*** (0.030)	-0.136*** (0.031)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.352*** (0.030)	0.475*** (0.026)	0.267*** (0.027)	0.298*** (0.027)	0.114*** (0.028)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.082*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.058*** (0.007)	0.073*** (0.007)	0.052*** (0.008)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.166*** (0.032)	-0.131*** (0.026)	-0.188*** (0.028)	-0.186*** (0.028)	-0.244*** (0.029)
Trust in people: yes	0.168*** (0.028)	0.133*** (0.023)	0.166*** (0.025)	0.208*** (0.025)	0.283*** (0.027)
Not working but with a job	0.096 (0.060)	0.021 (0.047)	-0.032 (0.052)	0.045 (0.052)	-0.090 (0.055)
Looking for a job	0.145*** (0.045)	0.086** (0.036)	0.154*** (0.040)	0.089** (0.039)	0.084** (0.042)
Student	0.174*** (0.051)	0.305*** (0.043)	0.282*** (0.045)	0.321*** (0.045)	0.198*** (0.048)
Homeworker	0.128*** (0.044)	0.084** (0.036)	0.088** (0.039)	0.091** (0.039)	0.187*** (0.041)
Inactive	0.145** (0.071)	0.211*** (0.062)	0.079 (0.066)	0.078 (0.067)	0.159** (0.070)
Urban	-0.211*** (0.033)	-0.136*** (0.028)	-0.227*** (0.030)	-0.213*** (0.030)	-0.238*** (0.031)
Num.Obs.	21431	21375	21195	21223	21501
R2	0.156	0.106	0.116	0.106	0.113
R2 Adj.	0.154	0.104	0.114	0.105	0.111
AIC	89113.2	80409.9	82804.1	82895.6	86282.2

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A7
OLS regression results by urban and rural area with country dummies.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Intercept	2.116*** (0.135)	2.896*** (0.265)	3.024*** (0.110)	3.594*** (0.233)	3.674*** (0.118)	4.181*** (0.249)	3.089*** (0.119)	4.076*** (0.245)	3.530*** (0.125)	4.107*** (0.265)
Age	0.015*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)
Sex: female	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.302*** (0.064)	0.021 (0.027)	-0.114** (0.054)	0.087*** (0.030)	-0.007 (0.057)	-0.035 (0.030)	-0.109* (0.056)	0.027 (0.031)	0.016 (0.060)

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Table A7 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
n° children	0.047*** (0.014)	0.012 (0.022)	0.032*** (0.011)	0.013 (0.019)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.031 (0.019)	0.041*** (0.012)	0.030 (0.020)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.025 (0.020)
Education	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.054*** (0.007)	-0.042*** (0.004)	-0.055*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.004)	-0.042*** (0.008)
Ethnicity: White	0.134*** (0.040)	0.119 (0.077)	0.105*** (0.033)	0.137** (0.067)	0.149*** (0.036)	0.112 (0.070)	0.098*** (0.035)	0.075 (0.068)	0.080** (0.037)	0.098 (0.073)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.010 (0.068)	-0.047 (0.090)	-0.014 (0.055)	-0.062 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.060)	0.028 (0.084)	0.027 (0.061)	0.170** (0.081)	-0.069 (0.064)	-0.184** (0.084)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.202*** (0.073)	-0.080 (0.128)	0.048 (0.062)	-0.016 (0.112)	-0.006 (0.065)	-0.086 (0.120)	-0.092 (0.065)	-0.151 (0.119)	-0.162** (0.069)	-0.024 (0.126)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.063 (0.073)	-0.175 (0.138)	-0.011 (0.056)	-0.073 (0.112)	0.097 (0.065)	-0.043 (0.123)	0.020 (0.066)	-0.044 (0.120)	-0.117* (0.068)	0.057 (0.133)
Civil status: single	-0.032 (0.037)	0.016 (0.064)	0.085*** (0.030)	0.107* (0.055)	0.020 (0.032)	0.033 (0.059)	0.071** (0.032)	0.062 (0.058)	-0.029 (0.033)	0.027 (0.060)
Income	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.005)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.253*** (0.040)	0.317*** (0.073)	0.119*** (0.032)	0.155** (0.064)	0.118*** (0.034)	0.183*** (0.065)	0.159*** (0.034)	0.149** (0.064)	0.088** (0.036)	0.046 (0.067)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.424*** (0.037)	-0.337*** (0.063)	-0.205*** (0.030)	-0.178*** (0.052)	-0.274*** (0.033)	-0.192*** (0.057)	-0.263*** (0.033)	-0.256*** (0.056)	-0.249*** (0.035)	-0.229*** (0.059)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.260*** (0.032)	0.100* (0.056)	0.195*** (0.026)	0.134*** (0.048)	0.166*** (0.029)	0.142*** (0.051)	0.207*** (0.029)	0.116** (0.051)	0.292*** (0.030)	0.326*** (0.053)
Crime Victimization	-0.246*** (0.034)	-0.315*** (0.069)	-0.255*** (0.027)	-0.112* (0.059)	-0.225*** (0.030)	-0.223*** (0.063)	-0.232*** (0.031)	-0.155** (0.064)	-0.315*** (0.032)	-0.277*** (0.066)
Party position: No	-0.350*** (0.040)	-0.451*** (0.067)	-0.594*** (0.033)	-0.533*** (0.058)	-0.228*** (0.035)	-0.311*** (0.060)	-0.145*** (0.035)	-0.216*** (0.059)	-0.106*** (0.036)	-0.232*** (0.062)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.349*** (0.035)	0.356*** (0.063)	0.460*** (0.029)	0.528*** (0.054)	0.273*** (0.031)	0.237*** (0.055)	0.297*** (0.030)	0.291*** (0.055)	0.109*** (0.032)	0.115** (0.058)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.087*** (0.009)	0.065*** (0.016)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.018 (0.014)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.073*** (0.008)	0.070*** (0.015)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.016)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.151*** (0.035)	-0.240*** (0.072)	-0.108*** (0.028)	-0.200*** (0.060)	-0.182*** (0.031)	-0.222*** (0.064)	-0.182*** (0.031)	-0.204*** (0.063)	-0.259*** (0.033)	-0.192*** (0.066)
Trust in people: yes	0.201*** (0.033)	0.057 (0.057)	0.176*** (0.027)	0.013 (0.049)	0.203*** (0.029)	0.063 (0.052)	0.231*** (0.029)	0.144*** (0.051)	0.303*** (0.031)	0.234*** (0.055)
Not working but with a job	0.109 (0.068)	0.086 (0.126)	-0.018 (0.053)	0.157 (0.104)	-0.030 (0.058)	-0.007 (0.111)	0.028 (0.060)	0.140 (0.103)	-0.114* (0.063)	0.033 (0.115)
Looking for a job	0.153*** (0.051)	0.149 (0.091)	0.109*** (0.041)	0.020 (0.076)	0.149*** (0.045)	0.178** (0.082)	0.058 (0.045)	0.199** (0.079)	0.046 (0.048)	0.222** (0.086)
Student	0.143** (0.058)	0.354*** (0.113)	0.282*** (0.048)	0.415*** (0.095)	0.251*** (0.051)	0.439*** (0.096)	0.290*** (0.051)	0.463*** (0.095)	0.157*** (0.054)	0.413*** (0.099)
Homeworker	0.133** (0.051)	0.176** (0.084)	0.067 (0.042)	0.142* (0.073)	0.063 (0.045)	0.157** (0.077)	0.053 (0.046)	0.200*** (0.076)	0.206*** (0.048)	0.186** (0.080)
Inactive	0.186** (0.086)	0.073 (0.127)	0.257*** (0.074)	0.124 (0.115)	0.114 (0.078)	0.014 (0.123)	0.112 (0.080)	0.035 (0.126)	0.106 (0.085)	0.293** (0.123)
Num.Obs.	16065	5366	16024	5351	15881	5314	15923	5300	16109	5392
R2	0.170	0.130	0.113	0.086	0.124	0.091	0.116	0.078	0.119	0.095
R2 Adj.	0.168	0.123	0.111	0.079	0.122	0.084	0.114	0.070	0.117	0.088
AIC	66639.9	22429.3	59775.2	20614.8	61653.1	21144.7	61969.9	20917.0	64340.4	21906.7

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A8
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of rural-urban difference in trust (Neumark, 1988).

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Overall	0.126*** (0.013)	0.004 (0.031)	0.145*** (0.011)	0.093*** (0.026)	0.163*** (0.011)	0.100*** (0.027)	0.175*** (0.011)	0.100*** (0.026)	0.211*** (0.032)	0.211*** (0.032)
Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	0.556** (0.246)	0.000 (0.000)	0.464** (0.189)	0.000 (0.000)	0.481** (0.202)	0.000 (0.000)	0.473** (0.209)	0.437** (0.219)	0.437** (0.219)
Age	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.171* (0.101)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.148* (0.082)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.097 (0.087)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.225*** (0.087)	-0.213** (0.092)	-0.213** (0.092)
Sex: female	0.002* (0.001)	-0.108*** (0.035)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.060** (0.030)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.042 (0.033)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.032)
n° children	0.005* (0.002)	-0.041 (0.030)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.032 (0.025)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.026)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.026)
Education	0.038*** (0.007)	0.010 (0.091)	0.067*** (0.006)	0.056 (0.071)	0.085*** (0.007)	-0.062 (0.075)	0.084*** (0.007)	-0.067 (0.076)	-0.089 (0.085)	-0.089 (0.085)
Ethnicity: White	-0.004* (0.002)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.038** (0.017)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.035* (0.020)	-0.035* (0.020)

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Table A8 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.000 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.006 (0.010)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)
Ethnicity: Black	0.002* (0.001)	0.023* (0.012)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.019* (0.010)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.024** (0.011)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.016* (0.009)	0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)
Civil status: single	0.002** (0.001)	0.117** (0.049)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.005 (0.042)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.010 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.044)	0.053 (0.048)	0.053 (0.048)
Income	0.092*** (0.007)	0.084* (0.046)	0.050*** (0.005)	-0.044 (0.039)	0.073*** (0.006)	0.003 (0.042)	0.071*** (0.006)	0.059 (0.041)	0.128*** (0.049)	0.128*** (0.049)
Trend hous. income: Improved	-0.014*** (0.003)	0.024 (0.018)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.032* (0.018)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.018*** (0.004)	0.034 (0.023)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.025 (0.021)	-0.010*** (0.002)	0.014 (0.020)	0.004 (0.021)	0.004 (0.021)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.112*** (0.035)	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.027 (0.029)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.014 (0.032)	0.012*** (0.002)	-0.060* (0.031)	0.018 (0.031)	0.018 (0.031)
Crime Victimization	0.025*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.029** (0.013)	0.022*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.015 (0.014)	0.017 (0.020)	0.017 (0.020)
Party position: No	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.139** (0.056)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.047 (0.049)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.035 (0.050)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.028 (0.051)	-0.075 (0.050)	-0.075 (0.050)
Interest in politics: Yes	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.022*** (0.004)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.020)	0.004 (0.022)	0.004 (0.022)
Policy against Inequality: Important	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.187* (0.098)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.099 (0.078)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.016 (0.086)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.020 (0.089)	0.003 (0.096)	0.003 (0.096)
Religion importance: Not important	0.015*** (0.004)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.019 (0.012)	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.022* (0.013)	0.015*** (0.003)	-0.016 (0.013)	0.010 (0.018)	0.010 (0.018)
Trust in people: yes	0.002** (0.001)	-0.061 (0.037)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.107*** (0.032)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.114*** (0.033)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.037 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.034)
Not working but with a job	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.000 (0.000)	0.011* (0.006)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.007 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)
Looking for a job	0.000 (0.001)	0.004 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.012)	0.000 (0.000)	0.019* (0.012)	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)
Student	-0.002** (0.001)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.015* (0.008)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.014* (0.008)	0.021** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)
Homeworker	0.010*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.021)	0.006** (0.003)	0.011 (0.017)	0.003 (0.003)	0.015 (0.018)	0.004 (0.003)	0.028 (0.018)	0.016 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)
Inactive	0.002 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.002** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)
Obs.	21431	21431	21375	21375	21195	21195	21223	21223	21501	21501

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

Table A9
Ordered logit regression results, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.080** (0.036)	0.036 (0.036)	0.116*** (0.035)	-0.010 (0.035)	0.080** (0.035)
n° children	0.019 (0.014)	0.029** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.014)	0.017 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)
Education	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.005)	-0.035*** (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.004)
Ethnicity: White	0.036 (0.038)	0.119*** (0.038)	0.204*** (0.038)	0.179*** (0.038)	0.272*** (0.037)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.073 (0.063)	0.017 (0.063)	-0.056 (0.063)	0.090 (0.062)	-0.124** (0.061)
Ethnicity: Black	0.116* (0.062)	-0.125* (0.064)	-0.222*** (0.062)	0.066 (0.062)	-0.191*** (0.062)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.407*** (0.065)	-0.155** (0.067)	0.129** (0.066)	0.360*** (0.066)	0.379*** (0.066)
Civil status: single	-0.114*** (0.035)	0.085** (0.036)	0.046 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.032 (0.035)
Income	-0.038*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.003)	-0.035*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.193*** (0.040)	0.124*** (0.041)	0.096** (0.040)	0.124*** (0.040)	-0.010 (0.040)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.464*** (0.038)	-0.228*** (0.038)	-0.220*** (0.037)	-0.305*** (0.037)	-0.161*** (0.037)

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Table A9 (continued)

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.207*** (0.033)	0.262*** (0.033)	0.175*** (0.033)	0.227*** (0.033)	0.369*** (0.033)
Crime Victimization	-0.184*** (0.037)	-0.239*** (0.037)	-0.199*** (0.037)	-0.213*** (0.037)	-0.313*** (0.036)
Party position: No	-0.294*** (0.036)	-0.675*** (0.036)	-0.288*** (0.036)	-0.158*** (0.036)	-0.119*** (0.036)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.262*** (0.035)	0.519*** (0.036)	0.281*** (0.035)	0.320*** (0.035)	0.013 (0.034)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.064*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.074*** (0.009)	0.054*** (0.009)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.038)	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.128*** (0.037)
Trust in people: yes	0.121*** (0.034)	0.167*** (0.034)	0.229*** (0.033)	0.258*** (0.033)	0.266*** (0.033)
Not working but with a job	0.314*** (0.069)	-0.024 (0.071)	-0.146** (0.069)	0.157** (0.069)	0.032 (0.068)
Looking for a job	0.098* (0.053)	0.028 (0.054)	-0.031 (0.053)	0.017 (0.052)	0.183*** (0.053)
Student	0.207*** (0.076)	0.275*** (0.076)	0.238*** (0.074)	0.305*** (0.074)	0.315*** (0.073)
Homeworker	0.118** (0.051)	0.059 (0.052)	-0.017 (0.051)	0.013 (0.051)	0.154*** (0.051)
Inactive	0.175** (0.088)	0.197** (0.087)	-0.047 (0.087)	0.002 (0.089)	0.199** (0.087)
Urban	0.035 (0.039)	-0.125*** (0.039)	-0.091** (0.039)	-0.094** (0.039)	-0.178*** (0.038)
Vote elected candidate	1.550*** (0.034)	0.331*** (0.033)	0.496*** (0.032)	0.518*** (0.032)	0.269*** (0.032)
Num.Obs.	12906	12860	12760	12776	12917
AIC	45576.4	42620.0	46560.3	47288.6	48840.5

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A10

Ordered logit regression results by urban and rural area, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)
Sex: female	-0.049 (0.041)	-0.203*** (0.077)	0.064 (0.041)	-0.084 (0.077)	0.135*** (0.040)	0.051 (0.076)	0.004 (0.040)	-0.070 (0.076)	0.096** (0.040)	-0.003 (0.075)
n° children	0.018 (0.016)	0.021 (0.026)	0.042** (0.016)	-0.006 (0.026)	0.040** (0.016)	0.048* (0.026)	0.016 (0.016)	0.018 (0.026)	0.019 (0.016)	-0.023 (0.026)
Education	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.005)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.034*** (0.005)	-0.044*** (0.009)	-0.037*** (0.005)	-0.046*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Ethnicity: White	0.019 (0.043)	0.080 (0.085)	0.114*** (0.043)	0.099 (0.084)	0.226*** (0.043)	0.076 (0.083)	0.203*** (0.042)	0.055 (0.083)	0.291*** (0.042)	0.160* (0.083)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.063 (0.082)	0.095 (0.100)	-0.034 (0.083)	0.055 (0.101)	-0.173** (0.083)	0.059 (0.101)	0.011 (0.081)	0.148 (0.099)	-0.177** (0.080)	-0.085 (0.098)
Ethnicity: Black	0.009 (0.074)	0.379*** (0.116)	-0.149* (0.076)	-0.048 (0.119)	-0.231*** (0.074)	-0.175 (0.118)	0.081 (0.074)	0.033 (0.119)	-0.189** (0.074)	-0.190 (0.116)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.429*** (0.074)	0.324** (0.141)	-0.161** (0.075)	-0.084 (0.144)	0.170** (0.074)	0.023 (0.142)	0.428*** (0.075)	0.138 (0.143)	0.414*** (0.074)	0.281* (0.146)
Civil status: single	-0.150*** (0.041)	0.016 (0.071)	0.082** (0.041)	0.092 (0.072)	0.048 (0.040)	0.048 (0.072)	-0.025 (0.040)	0.025 (0.071)	-0.050 (0.040)	0.016 (0.070)
Income	-0.038*** (0.003)	-0.039*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.003)	-0.037*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.160*** (0.046)	0.301*** (0.087)	0.114** (0.046)	0.150* (0.088)	0.089** (0.045)	0.119 (0.087)	0.132*** (0.045)	0.085 (0.086)	0.002 (0.045)	-0.049 (0.086)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.483*** (0.044)	-0.401*** (0.074)	-0.228*** (0.044)	-0.226*** (0.074)	-0.246*** (0.043)	-0.146** (0.073)	-0.321*** (0.043)	-0.256*** (0.074)	-0.165*** (0.043)	-0.152** (0.073)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.242*** (0.038)	0.086 (0.067)	0.281*** (0.039)	0.179*** (0.067)	0.179*** (0.038)	0.149** (0.067)	0.255*** (0.038)	0.134** (0.066)	0.372*** (0.038)	0.356*** (0.066)
Crime Victimization	-0.170*** (0.041)	-0.236*** (0.084)	-0.267*** (0.042)	-0.092 (0.084)	-0.188*** (0.041)	-0.233*** (0.084)	-0.210*** (0.041)	-0.198** (0.084)	-0.326*** (0.041)	-0.252*** (0.083)
Party position: No	-0.280*** (0.042)	-0.345*** (0.073)	-0.704*** (0.042)	-0.572*** (0.072)	-0.289*** (0.042)	-0.278*** (0.072)	-0.127*** (0.041)	-0.237*** (0.072)	-0.112*** (0.041)	-0.136* (0.071)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.249*** (0.040)	0.307*** (0.073)	0.495*** (0.041)	0.612*** (0.073)	0.290*** (0.040)	0.254*** (0.072)	0.326*** (0.040)	0.307*** (0.072)	0.001 (0.040)	0.047 (0.071)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.075***	0.029	0.032***	-0.001	0.049***	0.041**	0.077***	0.066***	0.058***	0.041**

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Table A10 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Religion importance: Not important	(0.011) -0.027	(0.019) -0.164*	(0.011) 0.002	(0.019) -0.096	(0.011) 0.019	(0.018) -0.191**	(0.011) -0.052	(0.019) -0.137	(0.011) -0.145***	(0.018) -0.057
Trust in people: yes	(0.042) 0.137***	(0.087) 0.045	(0.042) 0.231***	(0.089) -0.041	(0.041) 0.279***	(0.087) 0.068	(0.041) 0.278***	(0.086) 0.180***	(0.041) 0.312***	(0.086) 0.121*
Not working but with a job	(0.039) 0.346***	(0.068) 0.202	(0.039) -0.082	(0.068) 0.164	(0.039) -0.134*	(0.067) -0.180	(0.038) 0.105	(0.067) 0.329**	(0.038) 0.001	(0.067) 0.144
Looking for a job	(0.079) 0.099	(0.143) 0.104	(0.082) 0.049	(0.142) -0.028	(0.079) -0.018	(0.142) -0.046	(0.079) -0.019	(0.140) 0.155	(0.078) 0.135**	(0.137) 0.360***
Student	(0.061) 0.193**	(0.110) 0.286*	(0.062) 0.246***	(0.111) 0.370**	(0.060) 0.205**	(0.110) 0.374**	(0.059) 0.299***	(0.109) 0.349**	(0.060) 0.259***	(0.110) 0.517***
Homeworker	(0.086) 0.150**	(0.164) 0.086	(0.086) 0.036	(0.162) 0.153	(0.084) -0.016	(0.156) -0.009	(0.083) -0.018	(0.161) 0.111	(0.083) 0.120**	(0.158) 0.281***
Inactive	(0.061) 0.215**	(0.099) 0.088	(0.062) 0.203*	(0.100) 0.186	(0.060) -0.077	(0.099) 0.014	(0.060) -0.084	(0.099) 0.209	(0.060) 0.075	(0.098) 0.469***
Vote elected candidate	(0.106) 1.604***	(0.157) 1.371***	(0.105) 0.320***	(0.156) 0.357***	(0.104) 0.493***	(0.158) 0.507***	(0.106) 0.542***	(0.160) 0.441***	(0.105) 0.240***	(0.153) 0.349***
Num.Obs.	(0.039) 9813	(0.069) 3093	(0.037) 9781	(0.066) 3079	(0.037) 9705	(0.066) 3055	(0.037) 9728	(0.065) 3048	(0.036) 9822	(0.065) 3095
AIC	34334.5	11239.1	31965.2	10664.7	35163.7	11410.0	35862.7	11445.9	36981.9	11859.4

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A11
Ordered logit regression results with country dummies, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Age	0.014*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.074** (0.036)	0.033 (0.036)	0.096*** (0.036)	-0.034 (0.036)	0.025 (0.035)
n° children	0.045*** (0.014)	0.026* (0.014)	0.050*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)
Education	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.005)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.005)
Ethnicity: White	0.099** (0.043)	0.120*** (0.043)	0.148*** (0.042)	0.078* (0.042)	0.067 (0.042)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.032 (0.066)	0.025 (0.066)	0.031 (0.066)	0.058 (0.065)	-0.160** (0.064)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.220*** (0.078)	-0.096 (0.079)	-0.064 (0.077)	-0.112 (0.076)	-0.046 (0.075)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.022 (0.075)	0.034 (0.075)	0.156** (0.075)	0.030 (0.075)	0.026 (0.075)
Civil status: single	-0.009 (0.036)	0.091** (0.037)	0.031 (0.036)	0.045 (0.036)	-0.026 (0.036)
Income	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.152*** (0.041)	0.124*** (0.041)	0.087** (0.041)	0.105*** (0.040)	0.025 (0.040)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.381*** (0.038)	-0.227*** (0.038)	-0.233*** (0.038)	-0.273*** (0.038)	-0.203*** (0.037)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.244*** (0.034)	0.267*** (0.034)	0.199*** (0.033)	0.217*** (0.033)	0.361*** (0.033)
Crime Victimization	-0.210*** (0.037)	-0.260*** (0.038)	-0.224*** (0.037)	-0.224*** (0.037)	-0.327*** (0.036)
Party position: No	-0.371*** (0.038)	-0.664*** (0.038)	-0.285*** (0.037)	-0.173*** (0.037)	-0.112*** (0.037)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.283*** (0.036)	0.489*** (0.036)	0.245*** (0.035)	0.297*** (0.035)	0.060* (0.035)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.073*** (0.010)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.052*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.009)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.098** (0.039)	-0.098** (0.039)	-0.158*** (0.039)	-0.153*** (0.038)	-0.216*** (0.038)
Trust in people: yes	0.187*** (0.034)	0.142*** (0.035)	0.197*** (0.034)	0.239*** (0.034)	0.281*** (0.034)
Not working but with a job	0.161** (0.070)	0.060 (0.072)	-0.046 (0.070)	0.130* (0.069)	-0.033 (0.069)
Looking for a job	0.174*** (0.054)	0.090 (0.055)	0.119** (0.054)	0.104* (0.053)	0.102* (0.053)
Student	0.139* (0.077)	0.294*** (0.076)	0.261*** (0.074)	0.279*** (0.074)	0.214*** (0.074)

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Table A11 (continued)

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Homeworker	0.123** (0.052)	0.083 (0.053)	0.073 (0.052)	0.076 (0.052)	0.155*** (0.051)
Inactive	0.210** (0.089)	0.290*** (0.088)	0.107 (0.088)	0.080 (0.090)	0.148* (0.088)
Urban	-0.184*** (0.041)	-0.170*** (0.041)	-0.261*** (0.041)	-0.248*** (0.040)	-0.181*** (0.040)
Vote elected candidate	1.512*** (0.035)	0.313*** (0.033)	0.434*** (0.033)	0.479*** (0.033)	0.397*** (0.032)
Num.Obs.	12906	12860	12760	12776	12917
AIC	44479.4	42452.6	45728.0	46718.7	47961.9

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12

Ordered logit regression results by urban and rural area with country dummies, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Age	0.016*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)
Sex: female	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.252*** (0.078)	0.069* (0.041)	-0.106 (0.078)	0.125*** (0.041)	0.017 (0.077)	-0.012 (0.040)	-0.107 (0.077)	0.096** (0.040)	-0.003 (0.075)
n° children	0.045*** (0.017)	0.043 (0.027)	0.036** (0.017)	-0.007 (0.027)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.044* (0.026)	0.046*** (0.016)	0.035 (0.026)	0.019 (0.016)	-0.023 (0.026)
Education	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.040*** (0.010)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.051*** (0.010)	-0.037*** (0.005)	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Ethnicity: White	0.085* (0.048)	0.114 (0.094)	0.114** (0.048)	0.118 (0.093)	0.143*** (0.047)	0.102 (0.092)	0.104** (0.047)	-0.014 (0.092)	0.291*** (0.042)	0.160* (0.083)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.023 (0.085)	0.004 (0.108)	0.000 (0.085)	-0.047 (0.110)	-0.076 (0.085)	0.133 (0.111)	0.005 (0.082)	0.109 (0.108)	-0.177** (0.080)	-0.085 (0.098)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.288*** (0.091)	-0.010 (0.154)	-0.077 (0.091)	-0.169 (0.158)	-0.115 (0.089)	0.052 (0.154)	-0.049 (0.088)	-0.264* (0.156)	-0.189** (0.074)	-0.190 (0.116)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.021 (0.086)	-0.042 (0.158)	0.052 (0.086)	0.003 (0.157)	0.173** (0.086)	0.096 (0.155)	0.102 (0.086)	-0.143 (0.157)	0.414*** (0.074)	0.281* (0.146)
Civil status: single	-0.027 (0.042)	0.058 (0.074)	0.078* (0.042)	0.138* (0.075)	0.033 (0.042)	0.040 (0.075)	0.036 (0.041)	0.066 (0.074)	-0.050 (0.040)	0.016 (0.070)
Income	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.119** (0.047)	0.238*** (0.088)	0.118** (0.047)	0.150* (0.089)	0.076* (0.046)	0.123 (0.088)	0.109** (0.046)	0.072 (0.087)	0.002 (0.045)	-0.049 (0.086)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.392*** (0.045)	-0.338*** (0.075)	-0.228*** (0.045)	-0.219*** (0.075)	-0.264*** (0.044)	-0.144* (0.074)	-0.281*** (0.044)	-0.242*** (0.074)	-0.165*** (0.043)	-0.152** (0.073)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.277*** (0.039)	0.149* (0.068)	0.294*** (0.039)	0.163** (0.068)	0.208*** (0.038)	0.169** (0.068)	0.246*** (0.038)	0.142** (0.068)	0.372*** (0.038)	0.356*** (0.066)
Crime Victimization	-0.194*** (0.042)	-0.263*** (0.085)	-0.287*** (0.042)	-0.102 (0.085)	-0.208*** (0.041)	-0.267*** (0.084)	-0.224*** (0.041)	-0.200** (0.084)	-0.326*** (0.041)	-0.252*** (0.083)
Party position: No	-0.387*** (0.044)	-0.354*** (0.074)	-0.686*** (0.044)	-0.602*** (0.074)	-0.276*** (0.043)	-0.319*** (0.074)	-0.137*** (0.043)	-0.261*** (0.073)	-0.112*** (0.041)	-0.136* (0.071)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.270*** (0.041)	0.321*** (0.074)	0.459*** (0.041)	0.609*** (0.074)	0.244*** (0.041)	0.234*** (0.072)	0.296*** (0.040)	0.282*** (0.072)	0.001 (0.040)	0.047 (0.071)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.085*** (0.011)	0.036* (0.019)	0.043*** (0.011)	-0.003 (0.019)	0.058** (0.011)	0.037** (0.019)	0.069*** (0.011)	0.044** (0.019)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.041** (0.018)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.080* (0.044)	-0.192** (0.091)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.159* (0.092)	-0.132*** (0.043)	-0.277*** (0.090)	-0.155*** (0.043)	-0.145 (0.089)	-0.145*** (0.041)	-0.057 (0.086)
Trust in people: yes	0.219*** (0.040)	0.055 (0.069)	0.207*** (0.040)	-0.047 (0.069)	0.240*** (0.040)	0.076 (0.069)	0.267*** (0.039)	0.166** (0.069)	0.312*** (0.038)	0.121* (0.067)
Not working but with a job	0.194** (0.080)	0.059 (0.146)	0.011 (0.083)	0.201 (0.145)	-0.044 (0.081)	-0.069 (0.145)	0.103 (0.080)	0.261* (0.142)	0.001 (0.078)	0.144 (0.137)
Looking for a job	0.190*** (0.063)	0.177 (0.112)	0.107* (0.063)	0.040 (0.113)	0.126** (0.062)	0.121 (0.112)	0.079 (0.061)	0.210* (0.111)	0.135** (0.060)	0.360*** (0.110)
Student	0.125 (0.087)	0.270 (0.167)	0.259*** (0.087)	0.418** (0.165)	0.234*** (0.084)	0.403** (0.157)	0.256*** (0.083)	0.332** (0.163)	0.259*** (0.083)	0.517*** (0.158)
Homeworker	0.138** (0.062)	0.158 (0.101)	0.046 (0.062)	0.212** (0.101)	0.065 (0.062)	0.102 (0.101)	0.039 (0.061)	0.186* (0.101)	0.120** (0.060)	0.281*** (0.098)
Inactive	0.271** (0.108)	0.080 (0.160)	0.303*** (0.106)	0.258 (0.158)	0.077 (0.105)	0.173 (0.160)	0.018 (0.107)	0.075 (0.162)	0.469*** (0.105)	0.075 (0.153)
Vote elected candidate	1.577*** (0.040)	1.308*** (0.070)	0.297*** (0.038)	0.363*** (0.068)	0.429*** (0.038)	0.448*** (0.068)	0.482*** (0.038)	0.469*** (0.068)	0.240*** (0.036)	0.349*** (0.065)
Num.Obs.	9813	3093	9781	3079	9705	3055	9728	3048	9822	3095
AIC	33367.7	11097.9	31810.7	10659.4	34438.1	11299.8	35350.2	11382.6	36981.9	11859.4

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A13
OLS regression results, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Intercept	2.381*** (0.125)	2.914*** (0.110)	3.285*** (0.117)	3.340*** (0.116)	3.255*** (0.122)
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.078** (0.037)	0.044 (0.032)	0.110*** (0.035)	-0.011 (0.034)	0.075** (0.036)
n° children	0.025* (0.015)	0.029** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.010 (0.014)
Education	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.005)
Ethnicity: White	0.046 (0.040)	0.117*** (0.035)	0.204*** (0.037)	0.186*** (0.037)	0.284*** (0.039)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.046 (0.067)	0.016 (0.056)	-0.038 (0.063)	0.098 (0.061)	-0.129** (0.063)
Ethnicity: Black	0.153** (0.066)	-0.036 (0.060)	-0.176*** (0.063)	0.090 (0.064)	-0.176*** (0.067)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.412*** (0.070)	-0.109* (0.057)	0.140** (0.066)	0.369*** (0.068)	0.378*** (0.071)
Civil status: single	-0.112*** (0.037)	0.089*** (0.032)	0.043 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.036)
Income	-0.039*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.188*** (0.043)	0.114*** (0.037)	0.098** (0.040)	0.119*** (0.039)	-0.006 (0.041)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.479*** (0.040)	-0.192*** (0.034)	-0.209*** (0.037)	-0.294*** (0.037)	-0.168*** (0.039)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.212*** (0.035)	0.214*** (0.030)	0.168*** (0.032)	0.225*** (0.032)	0.383*** (0.034)
Crime Victimization	-0.191*** (0.039)	-0.215*** (0.032)	-0.192*** (0.036)	-0.204*** (0.036)	-0.325*** (0.038)
Party position: No	-0.312*** (0.039)	-0.642*** (0.034)	-0.292*** (0.036)	-0.152*** (0.036)	-0.121*** (0.037)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.274*** (0.037)	0.484*** (0.032)	0.282*** (0.034)	0.313*** (0.034)	0.015 (0.036)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.066*** (0.010)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.045*** (0.009)	0.069*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.010)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.057 (0.038)	-0.023 (0.033)	-0.027 (0.036)	-0.077** (0.035)	-0.135*** (0.038)
Trust in people: yes	0.137*** (0.035)	0.137*** (0.030)	0.215*** (0.033)	0.242*** (0.033)	0.272*** (0.034)
Not working but with a job	0.315*** (0.073)	-0.006 (0.061)	-0.143** (0.067)	0.155** (0.067)	0.036 (0.069)
Looking for a job	0.100* (0.056)	0.038 (0.047)	-0.012 (0.052)	0.033 (0.051)	0.199*** (0.056)
Student	0.204*** (0.078)	0.247*** (0.066)	0.254*** (0.069)	0.328*** (0.067)	0.333*** (0.072)
Homeworker	0.125** (0.055)	0.059 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.051)	0.023 (0.050)	0.170*** (0.054)
Inactive	0.173* (0.094)	0.193** (0.083)	-0.013 (0.089)	0.010 (0.092)	0.200** (0.093)
Urban	0.049 (0.041)	-0.094*** (0.036)	-0.090** (0.039)	-0.084** (0.038)	-0.178*** (0.040)
Vote elected candidate	1.681*** (0.034)	0.282*** (0.029)	0.493*** (0.031)	0.505*** (0.031)	0.288*** (0.033)
Num.Obs.	12906	12860	12760	12776	12917
R2	0.230	0.114	0.087	0.093	0.071
R2 Adj.	0.228	0.112	0.085	0.091	0.069
AIC	53013.9	48738.4	50446.3	50244.8	52249.4

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A14
OLS regression results by urban and rural area, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust Police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Intercept	2.287*** (0.146)	2.846*** (0.255)	2.747*** (0.127)	3.229*** (0.227)	3.059*** (0.135)	3.730*** (0.240)	3.115*** (0.134)	3.819*** (0.236)	2.989*** (0.141)	3.629*** (0.248)
Age	0.013*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)

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Table A14 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust Police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Sex: female	-0.045 (0.042)	-0.201** (0.082)	0.064* (0.036)	-0.043 (0.071)	0.124*** (0.039)	0.057 (0.076)	0.001 (0.039)	-0.060 (0.075)	0.090** (0.041)	-0.009 (0.080)
n° children	0.024 (0.018)	0.025 (0.029)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.000 (0.025)	0.038** (0.016)	0.046* (0.027)	0.018 (0.016)	0.019 (0.026)	0.021 (0.017)	-0.020 (0.027)
Education	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.049*** (0.009)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.048*** (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.009)
Ethnicity: White	0.024 (0.045)	0.105 (0.090)	0.111*** (0.039)	0.106 (0.079)	0.224*** (0.042)	0.081 (0.084)	0.209*** (0.041)	0.067 (0.082)	0.308*** (0.043)	0.158* (0.088)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.042 (0.088)	0.068 (0.107)	-0.030 (0.071)	0.056 (0.092)	-0.148* (0.080)	0.069 (0.104)	0.027 (0.080)	0.143 (0.097)	-0.177** (0.082)	-0.106 (0.103)
Ethnicity: Black	0.040 (0.079)	0.431*** (0.122)	-0.056 (0.071)	0.027 (0.113)	-0.180** (0.074)	-0.146 (0.123)	0.109 (0.075)	0.045 (0.125)	-0.167** (0.079)	-0.193 (0.128)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	0.427*** (0.079)	0.347** (0.151)	-0.126** (0.063)	-0.011 (0.135)	0.180** (0.074)	0.035 (0.145)	0.441*** (0.077)	0.126 (0.145)	0.417*** (0.078)	0.272* (0.163)
Civil status: single	-0.148*** (0.043)	0.014 (0.076)	0.083** (0.036)	0.104 (0.067)	0.049 (0.039)	0.036 (0.073)	-0.024 (0.039)	0.018 (0.071)	-0.049 (0.041)	0.019 (0.075)
Income	-0.038*** (0.003)	-0.042*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.038*** (0.006)	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.154*** (0.048)	0.303*** (0.092)	0.099** (0.041)	0.158* (0.083)	0.087** (0.044)	0.132 (0.089)	0.120*** (0.044)	0.105 (0.084)	0.006 (0.046)	-0.041 (0.091)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.501*** (0.046)	-0.399*** (0.079)	-0.191*** (0.039)	-0.195*** (0.067)	-0.234*** (0.042)	-0.141* (0.074)	-0.308*** (0.042)	-0.249*** (0.074)	-0.169*** (0.045)	-0.166** (0.078)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.253*** (0.040)	0.077 (0.071)	0.230*** (0.034)	0.151** (0.062)	0.168*** (0.037)	0.154** (0.067)	0.255*** (0.037)	0.124* (0.066)	0.383*** (0.039)	0.376*** (0.070)
Crime Victimization	-0.171*** (0.043)	-0.256*** (0.089)	-0.242*** (0.035)	-0.072 (0.076)	-0.179*** (0.040)	-0.230*** (0.083)	-0.199*** (0.040)	-0.190** (0.083)	-0.329*** (0.042)	-0.290*** (0.088)
Party position: No	-0.296*** (0.044)	-0.362*** (0.079)	-0.668*** (0.039)	-0.539*** (0.070)	-0.293*** (0.042)	-0.276*** (0.073)	-0.130*** (0.041)	-0.206*** (0.072)	-0.109** (0.043)	-0.140* (0.076)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.257*** (0.042)	0.327*** (0.078)	0.459*** (0.037)	0.573*** (0.070)	0.290*** (0.039)	0.250*** (0.072)	0.316*** (0.039)	0.309*** (0.071)	0.003 (0.040)	0.056 (0.075)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.077*** (0.011)	0.034 (0.021)	0.030*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.018)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.044** (0.019)	0.071*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.011)	0.038* (0.020)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.026 (0.043)	-0.182** (0.090)	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.100 (0.079)	0.011 (0.040)	-0.210** (0.084)	-0.063 (0.039)	-0.140* (0.083)	-0.152*** (0.041)	-0.058 (0.089)
Trust in people: yes	0.149*** (0.041)	0.070 (0.072)	0.185*** (0.034)	-0.020 (0.063)	0.258*** (0.038)	0.077 (0.069)	0.259*** (0.037)	0.174*** (0.067)	0.315*** (0.039)	0.137* (0.072)
Not working but with a job	0.339*** (0.082)	0.224 (0.155)	-0.043 (0.070)	0.116 (0.129)	-0.128* (0.076)	-0.184 (0.142)	0.106 (0.077)	0.321** (0.136)	0.004 (0.080)	0.155 (0.142)
Looking for a job	0.095 (0.064)	0.109 (0.118)	0.060 (0.054)	-0.036 (0.100)	-0.008 (0.059)	-0.005 (0.111)	-0.010 (0.058)	0.144** (0.108)	0.397*** (0.063)	0.144** (0.119)
Student	0.186** (0.087)	0.294* (0.176)	0.211*** (0.073)	0.362** (0.147)	0.211*** (0.079)	0.444*** (0.138)	0.323*** (0.075)	0.376** (0.147)	0.271*** (0.080)	0.580*** (0.158)
Homeworker	0.149** (0.065)	0.096 (0.105)	0.041 (0.056)	0.127 (0.094)	0.002 (0.060)	-0.005 (0.101)	-0.001 (0.059)	0.103 (0.100)	0.136** (0.063)	0.309*** (0.107)
Inactive	0.223** (0.113)	0.059 (0.169)	0.204** (0.100)	0.163 (0.149)	-0.033 (0.105)	0.022 (0.166)	-0.051 (0.111)	0.156 (0.165)	0.072 (0.113)	0.504*** (0.165)
Vote elected candidate	1.736*** (0.039)	1.489*** (0.069)	0.267*** (0.032)	0.324*** (0.060)	0.485*** (0.036)	0.517*** (0.066)	0.522*** (0.036)	0.437*** (0.065)	0.254*** (0.037)	0.377*** (0.069)
Num.Obs.	9813	3093	9781	3079	9705	3055	9728	3048	9822	3095
R2	0.243	0.197	0.118	0.101	0.088	0.082	0.097	0.077	0.075	0.056
R2 Adj.	0.241	0.191	0.116	0.093	0.086	0.075	0.095	0.069	0.072	0.048
AIC	40251.9	12767.0	36888.5	11853.2	38211.6	12246.3	38172.3	12090.3	39570.3	12687.1

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A15

OLS regression results with country dummies, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Intercept	1.685*** (0.141)	2.975*** (0.128)	3.631*** (0.134)	3.224*** (0.134)	3.590*** (0.140)
Age	0.014*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Sex: female	-0.067* (0.036)	0.042 (0.032)	0.092*** (0.034)	-0.032 (0.034)	0.019 (0.036)
n° children	0.047*** (0.014)	0.026** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.013)	0.043*** (0.013)	0.042*** (0.014)
Education	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.037*** (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.037*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.005)
Ethnicity: White	0.089**	0.118***	0.144***	0.073*	0.069

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Table A15 (continued)

	Trust president	Trust political parties	Trust Parliament	Trust Supr. Court of Justice	Trust police
Ethnicity: Indigenous	(0.042) 0.002 (0.067)	(0.039) 0.032 (0.057)	(0.040) 0.021 (0.062)	(0.040) 0.057 (0.062)	(0.042) -0.143** (0.064)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.180** (0.079)	-0.024 (0.071)	-0.021 (0.075)	-0.094 (0.075)	-0.041 (0.078)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.039 (0.075)	0.041 (0.065)	0.146** (0.073)	0.031 (0.074)	0.005 (0.077)
Civil status: single	-0.004 (0.037)	0.088*** (0.032)	0.026 (0.034)	0.039 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.036)
Income	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.004)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.144*** (0.042)	0.113*** (0.037)	0.079** (0.039)	0.098** (0.038)	0.036 (0.040)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.371*** (0.038)	-0.189*** (0.034)	-0.216*** (0.036)	-0.253*** (0.036)	-0.201*** (0.038)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.229*** (0.034)	0.215*** (0.030)	0.178*** (0.032)	0.209*** (0.032)	0.357*** (0.033)
Crime Victimization	-0.206*** (0.037)	-0.229*** (0.032)	-0.207*** (0.035)	-0.208*** (0.035)	-0.330*** (0.036)
Party position: No	-0.368*** (0.038)	-0.626*** (0.035)	-0.283*** (0.036)	-0.161*** (0.036)	-0.117*** (0.037)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.286*** (0.036)	0.458*** (0.033)	0.237*** (0.034)	0.285*** (0.033)	0.057 (0.035)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.069*** (0.010)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.056*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.010)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.091** (0.038)	-0.089*** (0.034)	-0.155*** (0.036)	-0.155*** (0.036)	-0.223*** (0.038)
Trust in people: yes	0.192*** (0.035)	0.119*** (0.031)	0.182*** (0.033)	0.220*** (0.033)	0.281*** (0.034)
Not working but with a job	0.158** (0.070)	0.065 (0.062)	-0.039 (0.066)	0.114* (0.066)	-0.024 (0.069)
Looking for a job	0.173*** (0.055)	0.078 (0.048)	0.123** (0.052)	0.108** (0.051)	0.121** (0.054)
Student	0.131* (0.076)	0.252*** (0.065)	0.265*** (0.065)	0.288*** (0.065)	0.237*** (0.070)
Homeworker	0.130** (0.054)	0.075 (0.048)	0.083* (0.050)	0.081 (0.050)	0.167*** (0.053)
Inactive	0.191** (0.091)	0.261*** (0.083)	0.119 (0.087)	0.075 (0.090)	0.148 (0.092)
Urban	-0.176*** (0.042)	-0.133*** (0.037)	-0.243*** (0.039)	-0.230*** (0.039)	-0.185*** (0.041)
Vote elected candidate	1.562*** (0.033)	0.261*** (0.029)	0.419*** (0.031)	0.453*** (0.031)	0.398*** (0.032)
Num.Obs.	12906	12860	12760	12776	12917
R2	0.291	0.127	0.145	0.134	0.134
R2 Adj.	0.289	0.124	0.142	0.132	0.131
AIC	51970.7	48579.9	49646.5	49681.1	51377.7

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A16

OLS regression results by urban and rural area with country dummies, including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Intercept	1.286*** (0.158)	2.240*** (0.334)	2.719*** (0.143)	3.479*** (0.303)	3.180*** (0.150)	4.249*** (0.327)	2.745*** (0.150)	4.151*** (0.316)	3.240*** (0.156)	4.265*** (0.347)
Age	0.015*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)
Sex: female	-0.017 (0.041)	-0.236*** (0.081)	0.068* (0.036)	-0.061 (0.071)	0.114*** (0.038)	0.026 (0.075)	-0.008 (0.038)	-0.102 (0.074)	0.032 (0.040)	-0.045 (0.079)
n° children	0.047*** (0.017)	0.040 (0.029)	0.034*** (0.015)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.049*** (0.015)	0.041 (0.027)	0.045*** (0.016)	0.034 (0.026)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.008 (0.027)
Education	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.035*** (0.010)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.049*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.039*** (0.010)
Ethnicity: White	0.072 (0.047)	0.116 (0.097)	0.108** (0.043)	0.128 (0.088)	0.135*** (0.045)	0.115 (0.092)	0.088** (0.044)	-0.003 (0.090)	0.053 (0.047)	0.084 (0.095)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	-0.007 (0.085)	-0.033 (0.113)	0.011 (0.071)	-0.022 (0.100)	-0.074 (0.076)	0.104 (0.110)	0.009 (0.079)	0.090 (0.105)	-0.113 (0.081)	-0.203* (0.107)
Ethnicity: Black	-0.239*** (0.092)	0.009 (0.155)	-0.003 (0.083)	-0.106 (0.143)	-0.065 (0.086)	0.081 (0.158)	-0.042 (0.085)	-0.248 (0.158)	-0.136 (0.089)	0.251 (0.163)

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Table A16 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.039 (0.086)	-0.029 (0.162)	0.044 (0.073)	0.053 (0.142)	0.155* (0.084)	0.109 (0.152)	0.101 (0.084)	-0.167 (0.153)	-0.026 (0.086)	0.145 (0.174)
Civil status: single	-0.019 (0.042)	0.054 (0.076)	0.074** (0.037)	0.137** (0.069)	0.030 (0.039)	0.035 (0.074)	0.034 (0.039)	0.058 (0.072)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.002 (0.076)
Income	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.007)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.007)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.007)
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.112** (0.047)	0.236*** (0.092)	0.102** (0.041)	0.158* (0.085)	0.065 (0.043)	0.123 (0.087)	0.097** (0.043)	0.088 (0.084)	0.025 (0.045)	0.072 (0.088)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.385*** (0.044)	-0.309*** (0.077)	-0.189*** (0.039)	-0.189*** (0.067)	-0.245*** (0.042)	-0.133* (0.074)	-0.259*** (0.042)	-0.225*** (0.073)	-0.196*** (0.044)	-0.198*** (0.076)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.263*** (0.039)	0.129* (0.070)	0.237*** (0.034)	0.135** (0.063)	0.181*** (0.036)	0.160** (0.067)	0.238*** (0.036)	0.121* (0.066)	0.357*** (0.038)	0.353*** (0.069)
Crime Victimization	-0.181*** (0.041)	-0.285*** (0.087)	-0.255*** (0.035)	-0.073 (0.076)	-0.191*** (0.038)	-0.249*** (0.081)	-0.207*** (0.039)	-0.179** (0.082)	-0.325*** (0.040)	-0.323*** (0.085)
Party position: No	-0.366*** (0.044)	-0.381*** (0.078)	-0.642*** (0.040)	-0.560*** (0.071)	-0.269*** (0.042)	-0.316*** (0.074)	-0.129*** (0.041)	-0.243*** (0.072)	-0.108** (0.043)	-0.159** (0.076)
Interest in politics: Yes	0.273*** (0.041)	0.320*** (0.077)	0.426*** (0.037)	0.567*** (0.070)	0.235*** (0.038)	0.219*** (0.071)	0.285*** (0.038)	0.269*** (0.071)	0.037 (0.039)	0.097 (0.075)
Policy against Inequality: Important	0.079*** (0.011)	0.040** (0.020)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.018)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.038* (0.020)	0.061*** (0.011)	0.041** (0.019)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.017 (0.020)
Religion importance: Not important	-0.071* (0.042)	-0.201** (0.091)	-0.072* (0.037)	-0.142* (0.082)	-0.134*** (0.039)	-0.271*** (0.085)	-0.160*** (0.040)	-0.143* (0.085)	-0.246*** (0.042)	-0.148* (0.087)
Trust in people: yes	0.220*** (0.040)	0.070 (0.072)	0.167*** (0.035)	-0.016 (0.064)	0.215*** (0.037)	0.094 (0.068)	0.242*** (0.037)	0.161** (0.068)	0.326*** (0.039)	0.168** (0.071)
Not working but with a job	0.183** (0.079)	0.076 (0.151)	0.032 (0.070)	0.147 (0.131)	-0.029 (0.074)	-0.070 (0.141)	0.081 (0.075)	0.243* (0.135)	-0.055 (0.078)	0.101 (0.143)
Looking for a job	0.181*** (0.062)	0.183 (0.117)	0.096* (0.054)	0.016 (0.101)	0.122** (0.058)	0.146 (0.112)	0.075 (0.057)	0.242** (0.108)	0.067 (0.061)	0.332*** (0.117)
Student	0.108 (0.083)	0.281 (0.176)	0.213*** (0.072)	0.399*** (0.147)	0.226*** (0.075)	0.464*** (0.133)	0.271*** (0.073)	0.360** (0.144)	0.179** (0.079)	0.512*** (0.150)
Homeworker	0.142** (0.063)	0.155 (0.105)	0.045 (0.056)	0.174* (0.096)	0.077 (0.059)	0.110 (0.101)	0.049 (0.059)	0.177* (0.100)	0.158*** (0.061)	0.269** (0.106)
Inactive	0.256** (0.108)	0.051 (0.167)	0.275*** (0.100)	0.209 (0.151)	0.103 (0.103)	0.148 (0.165)	0.045 (0.107)	0.160 (0.165)	0.041 (0.112)	0.406** (0.160)
Vote elected candidate	1.611*** (0.038)	1.380*** (0.070)	0.239*** (0.033)	0.330*** (0.062)	0.405*** (0.035)	0.450*** (0.067)	0.449*** (0.036)	0.451*** (0.066)	0.360*** (0.037)	0.512*** (0.069)
Num.Obs.	9813	3093	9781	3079	9705	3055	9728	3048	9822	3095
R2	0.313	0.238	0.135	0.109	0.154	0.123	0.146	0.105	0.146	0.113
R2 Adj.	0.310	0.228	0.131	0.097	0.151	0.111	0.142	0.093	0.142	0.102
AIC	39334.4	12635.7	36731.7	11855.6	37511.7	12140.8	37664.4	12028.9	38818.6	12523.1

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A17

Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of rural-urban difference in trust (Cotton, 1988), including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Overall	0.154*** (0.028)	-0.050 (0.043)	0.146*** (0.021)	0.095*** (0.037)	0.152*** (0.022)	0.091** (0.040)	0.165*** (0.022)	0.086** (0.040)	0.103*** (0.023)	0.178*** (0.042)
Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	0.559* (0.306)	0.000 (0.000)	0.482* (0.254)	0.000 (0.000)	0.671** (0.268)	0.000 (0.000)	0.704*** (0.270)	0.000 (0.000)	0.640** (0.287)
Age	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.121 (0.134)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.222* (0.117)	-0.004* (0.003)	-0.251** (0.123)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.264** (0.117)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.313** (0.128)
Sex: female	0.002 (0.002)	-0.073* (0.043)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.050 (0.040)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.031 (0.041)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.028 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.046 (0.044)
n° children	0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.035)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.043 (0.030)	0.008* (0.004)	0.008 (0.031)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.030)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.046 (0.033)
Education	0.031** (0.015)	-0.000 (0.113)	0.068*** (0.013)	0.080 (0.097)	0.079*** (0.015)	-0.120 (0.109)	0.081*** (0.014)	-0.098 (0.104)	0.068*** (0.015)	-0.105 (0.116)
Ethnicity: White	-0.003 (0.006)	0.019 (0.030)	-0.008* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.034 (0.026)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.036 (0.028)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.004 (0.007)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.025** (0.010)	0.004 (0.006)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.008 (0.010)
Ethnicity: Black	0.003 (0.003)	0.035*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.012)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.005** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.009 (0.013)
Civil status: single	0.003* (0.002)	0.102* (0.056)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.013 (0.051)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.054)	0.000 (0.002)	0.026 (0.051)	0.001 (0.002)	0.043 (0.057)
Income	0.090*** (0.000)	-0.034 (0.000)	0.054*** (0.000)	-0.082 (0.000)	0.078*** (0.000)	-0.051 (0.000)	0.076*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.004 (0.000)	0.062 (0.000)

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Table A17 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Trend hous. income: Improved	0.011 -0.008** (0.004)	(0.065) 0.031 (0.024)	(0.009) -0.005 (0.003)	(0.057) 0.012 (0.021)	(0.011) -0.004 (0.003)	(0.064) 0.009 (0.022)	(0.011) -0.005* (0.003)	(0.062) -0.003 (0.023)	(0.010) 0.000 (0.003)	(0.064) -0.010 (0.024)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.021*** (0.005)	0.033 (0.027)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.030 (0.025)	-0.013*** (0.004)	0.019 (0.025)	-0.008** (0.003)	0.001 (0.026)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.017*** (0.005)	-0.096** (0.041)	0.017*** (0.004)	-0.043 (0.035)	0.014*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.039)	0.019*** (0.005)	-0.072** (0.036)	0.032*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.040)
Crime Victimization	0.019*** (0.007)	-0.018 (0.027)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.036* (0.022)	0.019*** (0.007)	-0.011 (0.024)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.002 (0.025)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.008 (0.027)
Party position: No	0.010** (0.004)	-0.044 (0.060)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.085 (0.055)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.011 (0.057)	0.005* (0.003)	-0.051 (0.055)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.020 (0.057)
Interest in politics: Yes	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.024 (0.033)	-0.021*** (0.006)	0.040 (0.030)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.019 (0.033)
Policy against Inequality: Important	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.228* (0.128)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.152 (0.111)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009 (0.113)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.055 (0.123)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.105 (0.125)
Religion importance: Not important	0.007 (0.008)	-0.029 (0.025)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.021)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.041* (0.023)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.024)	0.014* (0.008)	0.018 (0.025)
Trust in people: yes	0.002 (0.002)	-0.046 (0.049)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.120*** (0.042)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.106** (0.046)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.050 (0.046)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.105** (0.047)
Not working but with a job	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.000 (0.001)	0.009 (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.000 (0.001)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.009 (0.009)
Looking for a job	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.011 (0.013)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.029* (0.016)
Student	-0.002 (0.002)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.014 (0.009)
Homeworker	0.012 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.020)	0.005 (0.006)	0.018 (0.018)	0.000 (0.007)	0.002 (0.019)	0.002 (0.007)	0.021 (0.019)	0.015** (0.008)	0.036* (0.020)
Inactive	0.003 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.009 (0.007)	0.003 (0.003)	0.020** (0.008)
Vote elected candidate	0.026 (0.016)	-0.144*** (0.045)	0.004 (0.003)	0.033 (0.039)	0.008 (0.005)	0.019 (0.044)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.049 (0.041)	0.004 (0.004)	0.072 (0.044)
Obs.	12906	12906	12860	12860	12760	12760	12776	12776	12917	12917

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

Table A18

Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of rural-urban difference in trust (Neumark, 1988), including vote for elected candidate.

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Overall	0.148*** (0.025)	-0.044 (0.037)	0.157*** (0.016)	0.084*** (0.033)	0.162*** (0.016)	0.081** (0.035)	0.176*** (0.016)	0.076** (0.035)	0.178*** (0.042)	0.178*** (0.042)
Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	0.559* (0.306)	0.000 (0.000)	0.482* (0.254)	0.000 (0.000)	0.671** (0.268)	0.000 (0.000)	0.704*** (0.270)	0.640** (0.287)	0.640** (0.287)
Age	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.121 (0.132)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.222* (0.115)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.252** (0.121)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.264** (0.115)	-0.313** (0.128)	-0.313** (0.128)
Sex: female	0.002 (0.001)	-0.073* (0.042)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.031 (0.040)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.046 (0.044)	-0.046 (0.044)
n° children	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.038)	0.006** (0.003)	-0.043 (0.033)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.008 (0.034)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.033)	-0.046 (0.033)	-0.046 (0.033)
Education	0.028*** (0.010)	0.002 (0.102)	0.070*** (0.009)	0.078 (0.088)	0.080*** (0.009)	-0.121 (0.098)	0.082*** (0.009)	-0.099 (0.094)	-0.105 (0.116)	-0.105 (0.116)
Ethnicity: White	-0.004 (0.003)	0.020 (0.025)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.020)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.033 (0.021)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.034 (0.022)	-0.036 (0.028)	-0.036 (0.028)
Ethnicity: Indigenous	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.004)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.019 (0.014)	0.009* (0.005)	0.009 (0.013)	0.008 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)
Ethnicity: Black	0.003* (0.002)	0.035*** (0.013)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.003 (0.013)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)
Ethnicity: Mestizo	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.011)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.020** (0.010)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.013)
Civil status: single	0.003** (0.002)	0.102* (0.054)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.013 (0.049)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.053)	0.001 (0.001)	0.026 (0.050)	0.043 (0.057)	0.043 (0.057)
Income	0.091*** (0.008)	-0.035 (0.057)	0.056*** (0.006)	-0.084* (0.050)	0.080*** (0.008)	-0.053 (0.057)	0.078*** (0.008)	-0.003 (0.055)	0.062 (0.064)	0.062 (0.064)
Trend hous. income: Improved	-0.008*** (0.003)	0.031 (0.021)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.009 (0.020)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.024)
Trend hous. income: Worsened	-0.021*** (0.005)	0.033 (0.029)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.009*** (0.003)	0.030 (0.027)	-0.013*** (0.003)	0.019 (0.027)	0.001 (0.026)	0.001 (0.026)
Neighb. perceived safety: Safe	0.017*** (0.003)	-0.096** (0.045)	0.018*** (0.003)	-0.044 (0.038)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.042)	0.019*** (0.004)	-0.072* (0.040)	-0.004 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.040)
Crime Victimization	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.018 (0.021)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.034** (0.017)	0.019*** (0.004)	-0.012 (0.019)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.020)	0.008 (0.027)	0.008 (0.027)

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Table A18 (continued)

	Trust president		Trust political parties		Trust Parliament		Trust Supr. Court of Justice		Trust police	
	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.	Expl.	Unexp.
Party position: No	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.044 (0.059)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.085 (0.053)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011 (0.056)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.051 (0.054)	-0.020 (0.057)	-0.020 (0.057)
Interest in politics: Yes	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.024 (0.031)	-0.021*** (0.005)	0.040 (0.028)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.019 (0.033)	0.019 (0.033)
Policy against Inequality: Important	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.228* (0.126)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.152 (0.109)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.010 (0.112)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.055 (0.121)	-0.105 (0.125)	-0.105 (0.125)
Religion importance: Not important	0.006 (0.004)	-0.028 (0.018)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.041** (0.017)	0.009** (0.004)	-0.015 (0.018)	0.018 (0.025)	0.018 (0.025)
Trust in people: yes	0.002 (0.002)	-0.046 (0.050)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.120*** (0.043)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.106** (0.047)	0.004* (0.003)	-0.050 (0.047)	-0.105** (0.047)	-0.105** (0.047)
Not working but with a job	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	0.009 (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.000 (0.001)	0.012 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)
Looking for a job	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.011 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.023 (0.014)	0.029* (0.016)	0.029* (0.016)
Student	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.008)	0.014 (0.009)	0.014 (0.009)
Homeworker	0.010** (0.005)	-0.010 (0.025)	0.006 (0.004)	0.017 (0.022)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.024)	0.002 (0.004)	0.021 (0.024)	0.036* (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)
Inactive	0.003 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.003** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.009)	0.000 (0.001)	0.009 (0.009)	0.020** (0.008)	0.020** (0.008)
Vote elected candidate	0.026 (0.017)	-0.144*** (0.045)	0.004 (0.003)	0.033 (0.040)	0.008 (0.005)	0.019 (0.045)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.049 (0.042)	0.072 (0.044)	0.072 (0.044)
Obs.	12906	12906	12860	12860	12760	12760	12776	12776	12917	12917

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

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