Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms. Discovering its true dynamics and exploring adjustments which improve the commitment of everyone involved could benefit scientific development for all disciplines and consequently increase innovation in the economy and the society. We have reported the results of an innovative experiment developed to model peer review. We demonstrate that offering material rewards to referees tends to decrease the quality and efficiency of the reviewing process. Our findings help to discuss the viability of different options of incentive provision, supporting the idea that journal editors and responsible of research funding agencies should be extremely careful in offering material incentives on reviewing, since these might undermine moral motives which guide referees' behavior.

Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study

SQUAZZONI, Flaminio;
2013-01-01

Abstract

Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms. Discovering its true dynamics and exploring adjustments which improve the commitment of everyone involved could benefit scientific development for all disciplines and consequently increase innovation in the economy and the society. We have reported the results of an innovative experiment developed to model peer review. We demonstrate that offering material rewards to referees tends to decrease the quality and efficiency of the reviewing process. Our findings help to discuss the viability of different options of incentive provision, supporting the idea that journal editors and responsible of research funding agencies should be extremely careful in offering material incentives on reviewing, since these might undermine moral motives which guide referees' behavior.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
SquazzoniBravoTakacs2013ResearchPolicy.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: Articolo
Tipologia: Full Text
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 520.72 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
520.72 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
SquazzoniBravoTakacs2013ResearchPolicy.pdf

gestori archivio

Descrizione: Full text
Tipologia: Full Text
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 520.72 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
520.72 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11379/147736
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 64
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 57
social impact