According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit would change the behavior of chief executives because they do not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 59 countries over the period 1975-1997. We use both cluster analysis and paned data estimation techniques. We are unable to find any significant difference in the behavior of term limited chief executives with respect to those who are not. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results on US and international data.
Chief executives' term limits and fiscal policy choices: international evidence
DALLE NOGARE, Chiara;
2004-01-01
Abstract
According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit would change the behavior of chief executives because they do not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 59 countries over the period 1975-1997. We use both cluster analysis and paned data estimation techniques. We are unable to find any significant difference in the behavior of term limited chief executives with respect to those who are not. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results on US and international data.File in questo prodotto:
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